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FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 5 WINTER 1977 NUMBER 1
PARTNERSHIP ALLOCATIONS AND TAX REFORM
DONALD J. WEIDNER*
I. INTRODUCTION
When may investors pool their assets and determine among them-
selves how they will share the federal income tax burdens and benefits
of the properties they hold as coowners? If the pooling is accomplished
through the corporate form, the power to allocate among contributors
is minimal. The corporation will be treated as an independent taxpay-
ing entity that may not distribute its items of deduction or overall tax
loss to its shareholders. On the other hand, certain unincorporated
forms of coownership do not involve the recognition of an independent
taxpaying entity. The two most important are coownership through a
partnership and, in the words of the Regulations, "mere coownership."
Although as a practical matter mere coowners often allocate items of in-
come and expense among themselves, the interest of each coowner is
treated essentially as an independent interest for tax purposes. If, how-
ever, the activity of the coowners is substantial enough to constitute
"any business, financial operation, or venture," their coownership will
be deemed to constitute a partnership for tax purposes.
Partnership classification may be extremely preferable to mere co-
ownership. The Internal Revenue Code gives partners broad flexibility
to decide among themselves how they will divide the various items of
partnership income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit. Individuals with
different financial and income tax characteristics use the freedom to al-
locate to lick the platter of cash and tax benefits cleaner than they
could as unrelated coowners. Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1976,1
allocations agreed upon by partners were respected unless they were for
the "principal purpose" of tax avoidance or evasion.' Allocations that
violated the principal purpose limitation were disregarded and real-
* Associate Professor, Florida State University College of Law. B.S. 1966, Fordham
University; J.D. 1969, University of Texas at Austin.
The author wishes to express his appreciation to Martin D. Kriegel, of Cleveland State
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1. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 [hereinafter 1976 Act].
2. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, as amended immediately prior to the passage of the 1976
Act, § 704(a) and (b)(2) [hereinafter CODE]. Unless otherwise indicated herein, the CODE
partnership provisions under discussion are not changed by the 1976 Act.
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located according to the partners' ratio for sharing the "taxable income
or loss of the partnership, as described in section 702(a)(9). . . ."s The
1976 Act makes several changes in the provisions governing partnership
allocations. Most basically, it removes the provisions just quoted and
provides that an allocation will be respected unless it "does not have
substantial economic effect." 4 An allocation that lacks substantial eco-
nomic effect will be reallocated according to each partner's "interest in
the partnership (determined by taking into account all facts and cir-
cumstances)." 5
The purpose of this article is to explore the outer limits of permissi-
ble partnership allocations, with emphasis on allocation issues that fre-
quently arise in "tax shelter" partnerships. For several reasons, the
allocation provisions of the 1976 Act will not be discussed until after
an examination of the law as it stood immediately prior to its passage.
Most basically, the examination of prior law will make clear that the
1976 Act makes little, if any, change in the law of partnership alloca-
tions. Prior authority, therefore, retains its vitality, and it continues to
be important to understand how the Internal Revenue Service and the
courts have applied the principal purpose limitation. To the extent the
1976 Act will be deemed to have made substantive changes, contro-
versies will continue to arise concerning situations that antedated its
effective dates. Finally, some readers will find it more convenient to
have the 1976 Act discussed in one relatively compact section rather
than integrated piecemeal into a rather extensive discussion of a wide
range of allocation issues.
II. THE PARTNERSHIP FORM
The purpose of this section is to demonstrate that a determination
that a coownership is a partnership for tax purposes may affect more
than the manner in which various items of income and loss may be al-
located. The added dimension of partnership status may affect whether
there is anything to allocate and, if so, of what character. This is true
because the partnership is, for many purposes, treated as an entity dis-
tinct from its members. Most basically, although the partnership is not
a taxpaying entity, it is a separate tax computing and reporting entity.6
3. CODE § 704(b).
4. 1976 Act § 213(d), amending CoDE § 704(a) and (b), effective for taxable years of the
partnership beginning after December 31, 1975.
5. Id.
6. Coowners who would wish to allocate specially if classified a partnership should be
aware of the so called "undivided interests rule" of CODE § 704(c)(3):
(3) Undivided interests.-If the partnership agreement does not provide otherwise,
depreciation, depletion, or gain or loss with respect to undivided interests in prop-
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As such, it preempts decisions that would otherwise be made by indi-
vidual coowners. The partnership has its own taxable year and it, rather
than the individual partners, makes the basic decisions with respect to
the computation of partnership income. 7 It determines, for example,
the method of computing depreciation of partnership property,"
whether to use a cash or accrual method of accounting,9 and whether
to report income from an installment sale on an installment method.10
On the other hand, the partnership will, for some purposes, be viewed
as simply an aggregate of its members. The flexibility to allocate among
partners is a modification of a strict entity approach because it permits
a partnership to allocate the tax consequences of its operations after
taking into account the individual characteristics, contributions, and
needs of its members.
It should be emphasized that coowners can be deemed to be part-
ners for tax purposes even though their relationship is not one of part-
nership under state law. Tax classification is determined under the
Internal Revenue Code and is independent of local law classification.-
For example, despite repeated statement in the Official Comment to
the Uniform Limited Partnership Act that a limited partner is "not in
any sense a partner," a limited partnership can be held to be a partner-
ship for tax purposes even if its sole general partner is a corporation.12
In short, a partnership may be found to exist for tax purposes even
though the participants never intended or expected to be treated as
partners. 3
It is the presence of business activity that can result in the automatic
classification of a coownership as a partnership for tax purposes. The
Code defines the term partnership to include any group "through or by
means of which any business, financial operation, or venture is carried
on, and which is not.., a corporation or a trust or estate.' 4 The Regu-
lations provide that a joint undertaking "merely to share expenses" does
erty contributed to a partnership shall be determined as though such undivided
interests had not been contributed to the partnership. This paragraph shall apply
only if all the partners had undivided interests in such property prior to contribu-
tion and their interests in the capital and profits of the partnership correspond
with such undivided interests.
7. CODE § 703(b).
8. CODE § 167.
9. CODE §§ 446(c) and 703(b); Treas. Reg. § 1.703-1(b) (1974).
10. CODE § 453.
11. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(c) (1965).
12. Phillip G. Larson, 66 T.C. No. 21 (April 27, 1976).
13. Treas. Reg. § 1.761-1(a) (1972): "The term 'partnership' is broader in scope than
the common law meaning of partnership, and may include groups not commonly called
partnerships."
14. CODE § 761(a).
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not constitute a partnership, nor does "[m]ere co-ownership of property
which is maintained, kept in repair, and rented or leased."'51 On the
other hand:
Tenants in common ... may be partners if they actively carry on a
trade, business, financial operation, or venture and divide the profits
thereof. For example, a partnership exists if coowners of an apart-
ment building lease space and in addition provide services to the oc-
cupants either directly or through an agent. 6
Revenue Ruling 75-37417 may indicate the maximum level of busi-
ness activity that can be present before coowners will be deemed part-
ners.18 A life insurance company and a real estate investment trust each
owned an undivided one-half interest in an apartment project that was
operated and maintained by an unrelated management corporation.
The management company performed services "customarily associated
with maintenance and repair,"' 9 including heat, air conditioning, hot
and cold water, unattended parking, normal repairs, trash removal, and
cleaning of public areas. Customary services were furnished to tenants
15. Treas. Reg. § 1.761-1(a) (1972):
A joint undertaking merely to share expenses is not a partnership. For example, if
two or more persons jointly construct a ditch merely to drain surface water from
their properties, they are not partners. Mere coownership of property which is
maintained, kept in repair, and rented or leased does not constitute a partnership.
For example, if an individual owner, or tenants in common, of farm property lease
it to a farmer for a cash rental or a share of the crops, they do not necessarily create
a partnership thereby.
16. Id.
17. 1975-2 C.B. 261.
18. In certain situations a coownership that constitutes a partnership may elect to be
excluded from the application of subchapter K. CODE § 761(a) provides, in part:
Under regulations the Secretary or his delegate may, at the election of all the mem-
bers of an unincorporated organization, exclude such organization from the applica-
tion of all or part of this subchapter, if it is availed of-
(1) for investment purposes only and not for the active conduct of a business, or
(2) for the joint production, extraction, or use of property, but not for the pur-
pose of selling services or property produced or extracted,
if the income of the members of the organization may be adequately determined
without the computation of partnership taxable income.
See also Treas. Reg. § 1.761-2 (1972); Rev. Rul. 68-344, 1968-1 C.B. 569; and J. PENNELL
& J. O'BYRNE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF PARTNERS AND PARTNERSHIPS 20-26 (1970).
19. 1975-2 C.B. at 261:
Generally, under the management agreement [the management company] negoti-
ates and executes leases for apartment units in the project; collects rents and other
payments from tenants; pays taxes, assessments, and insurance premiums payable
with respect to the project; performs all other services customarily performed in
connection with the maintenance and repair of an apartment project; and performs
certain additional services for the tenants beyond those customarily associated with
maintenance and repair.
PARTNERSHIP ALLOCATIONS
at no additional charge above their basic rental. All costs incurred by
the management company in rendering the customary services were
absorbed by the coowners, who each paid the management company "a
percentage of one-half of the gross rental receipts derived from the op-
eration of the project" as compensation for the customary services. The
management company also performed "certain additional services," in-
cluding attendant parking, cabanas, and gas, electricity and other util-
ities. The additional services were furnished to the tenants for a
separate charge. The management company bore all the costs incurred
in providing the additional services and retained for its own use all the
charges paid for them, which were stated to be adequate compensation.
The Ruling stated that the furnishing of customary services in con-
nection with the maintenance and repair of an apartment project does
not render a coownership a partnership.
However, the furnishing of additional services will render a coowner-
ship a partnership if the additional services are furnished directly by
the coowners or through their agent. 20
It was held that, by reason of the contractual arrangement with the
management company, the coowners were not furnishing the additional
services either directly or through an agent. The Ruling emphasized
that the management company was solely responsible for determining
the time and manner of furnishing the services, bore all the expenses of
providing them, and retained for its own use all the income they pro-
duced. None of the profits arising from the additional services were
divided with the life insurance company or the real estate investment
trust. Therefore, they were "treated as coowners and not as partners."21
A. Partnership Triggers Recognition of Gain
In George Helmer2 2 a finding that property held in the names of
two individuals was owned by a partnership resulted in the recognition
of gain in a situation in which there would be no gain under coowner-
ship classification.2 3 The Tax Court found that a cattle raising partner-
20. Id.
21. Id. The Ruling did not state precisely what issue was involved. It appears to have
concerned the passive investment requirements of real estate investment trusts. See
Allen, 107-3rd T.M., Real Estate investment Trusts A-41 (1976).
22. [1975] 34 TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 727.
23. The finding that the land was owned by the partnership is not surprising. Al-
though the brothers never entered into any formal or written partnership agreement,
partnership returns in the name of "Helmer Brothers" were filed for each of the years in
question. Although the evidence "was cursory at best" as to whether the land in question
was owned by the brothers individually or by their partnership:
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ship that consisted of two brothers, rather than the brothers as coown-
ers, owned land that was optioned to a development corporation. The
option called for an initial payment of $150,000 and annual payments
of $75,000. Upon exercise of the option, the purchase price was to be
reduced by the amount of option payments made, but there was no
provision for refund of the payments should the agreement terminate.
Payments were made to an escrow agent, which distributed them to the
Helmer brothers after subtracting taxes, interest, and principal due on
the property. During the three years in question the optionee made the
required payments and neither forfeited nor exercised the option. The
escrow agent paid the Helmers by checks which they endorsed and de-
posited into their personal bank accounts rather than into their part-
nership bank account.
It was held that the checks deposited into the brothers' personal ac-
counts constituted distributions of cash from the partnership. The
Service had
conceded that the income from the option payments was deferrable
by the partnership until characterized as ordinary income (because of
a default by the optionee) or capital gains (because of an exercise of
the option by the optionee).24
Nevertheless, the court held that the distribution to the two brothers
from their own partnership was a taxable event. They were required to
pay tax to the extent the distributions exceeded their bases in their
partnership interests.25 The court confessed that its holding "may run
The partnership books and tax returns for 1966 through 1969 listed the land sub-
ject to the option as an asset of the partnership. The balance sheets of the partner-
ship returns for 1967, 1968 and 1969 also listed the allocable part of the option
deposit payments to George and T. L. Helmer as partnership liabilities. The
amounts received directly by petitioners were reflected as distributions to them on
pertinent tax returns and on the partnership books.
• ..Having represented to the Internal Revenue Service that this property was
owned by the partnership, the partners are bound by such representation.
34 TAX CT. MEM. DEc. (CCH) at 729-30.
24. 34 TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) at 731.
25. The brothers alternatively argued that no gain arose because the distributions of
cash were not in excess of their bases in their partnership interests. Their theory was that
the receipt of the option payments created a partnership liability in which they shared for
basis purposes. See CODE § 752(a) and Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(a)(1) (1960). The Tax Court
held that no partnership liability was created:
There were no provisions in the option agreement for repayment of the amounts
paid under the agreement should the agreement terminate. The moneys received
under the option agreement were received without any restrictions except that upon
exercise of the option such amounts would be applied against the purchase price.
Thus, the restriction only affected the character of the gain in the partnership's
hands.
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counter to the general concept of subchapter K that the partnership is
a conduit as to income and loss items."2 6
Similarly, if a partnership is deemed to exist, it as an entity, rather
than its individual members, is entitled to make important elections to
defer recognition of gain. In Thomas K. McManus,2 7 the taxpayer was
found to have been a partner of the two individuals with whom he had
purchased property, a portion of which was condemned. He reinvested
his share of the condemnation proceeds and attempted to elect to defer
the gain realized on the condemnation sale under the provisions of
Code section 1033. The court held that he could not avail himself of
the 1033 election because of the presence of the partnership. The part-
nership, rather than the partners individually, must make the election,
even though the Code specifies that nonrecognition is available "at the
election of the taxpayer. ' 28
B. Partnership Limits Recognition of Loss
Just as the Tax Court confessed a certain amount of infidelity to the
conduit approach in taxing the brothers Helmer, the Service. recently
held strictly to the entity approach to disallow an allocation that was
arguably permissible under the Regulations. Example 4 of the principal
purpose Regulations deals with the following situation:
KL is a brokerage partnership with assets consisting of securities
with a basis of $20,000 and a value of $50,000. M makes a $25,000
cash contribution to the partnership in order to become an equal
partner. Subsequently, when the value of the securities has appreci-
ated to $74,000, they are sold. Of the $54,000 taxable gain on the sale
of the securities, $24,000 (appreciation in value occurring after M
became a partner) is allocated in equal shares to K, L, and M, in
accordance with the ratio for sharing profits and losses generally. The
34 TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) at 731.
26. The Tax Court obviously felt uncomfortable with its decision and suggested the
case might have been litigated differently:
We believe that the problem created in this case is analagous to the receipt of
tax-exempt income under section 705(a)(l)(B) which permits a partner's basis to be
increased by the amount of such income so that upon distribution there will be no
recognition of gain in excess of basis. . . .Neither party, however, raised the issue
whether, under other provisions of subchapter K, there would not be recognition
of income to the petitioners in this case. We therefore express no opinion with
regard to issues other than those raised by the parties as noted on page 2 of
this opinion.
34 TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) at 731 n.4.
27. 65 T.C. 197 (1975).
28. CODE § 1033(a)(3)(A). See also Mihran Demirjian, 54 T.C. 1691, 1698-1701 (1970),
aff'd, 457 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1972).
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$30,000 balance is allocated to K and L in the profit and loss ratio
existing before M became a partner.2 9
The Regulation states that the allocation of tax burden will be recog-
nized "even though the cash proceeds are a partnership asset in which
all three partners share equally," because it "attributes to K and L
the appreciation in value of the securities occurring before M became
a partner. ' '3
0
What freedom to allocate would exist if the securities depreciated
after M's admission? Example 4 approves an allocation that attributes
to existing partners the appreciation in value that occurred before the
admission of a new member. K and L were, in effect, each credited
with $15,000 gain on M's admission. From that point forward, K,
L, and M shared equally in appreciation gain. If the securities declined
in value and were sold for $44,000, there would be an economic loss of
$6,000 from the point of M's admission. Could that loss be allocated
equally among the partners and debited against M's zero starting point
and K's and L's $15,000 starting points? The result would be that M
would report a loss of $2,000 and K and L would each report gains of
$13,000, the $15,000 attributed to them on M's admission reduced by
$2,000. The $13,000 gains of K and L and M's $2,000 loss would net
out to $24,000, exactly the total gain to be reported by the partnership.
Without referring to Example 4, Revenue Ruling 75-458 3 held
that such an allocation would be impermissible because it would "re-
sult in some partners reporting gains greater than those actually realized
by the partnership and other partners reporting losses that were never
sustained . . .,,3
The formula described in the partnership agreement, by providing
for allocation to each partner at specified times a share of the un-
realized appreciation and depreciation in each partnership security,
purports to assign to each partner a basis in each partnership security
that is separate from the firm's basis for such security. Thus, under
this formula, while gain or loss on each transaction would be de-
termined with reference to an amount treated as if it were a partner's
separate basis in the partnership property, there is no legal authority
for such treatment under the circumstances of the instant case.33
29. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b), Example (4) (1964).
30. Id.
31. 1975-2 C.B. 258.
32. 1975-2 C.B. at 260.
33. id.
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The Ruling noted that the partners could not avail themselves of the
optional adjustment to basis provisions34 that permit deviation from a
strict entity approach. Those provisions apply when a partnership inter-
est is transferred by sale or exchange or on the death of a partner, but
not on the admission of a new partner.3 5 The Ruling also made the
comparison with the rules that authorize partners to take into account
unrealized appreciation or depreciation of contributed property.3
Those specifically authorized allocations are subject to a "ceiling" of
the amount of gain or loss realized by the partnership.37
Partnership doctrine may affect the character, as well as the amount
of loss that will be recognized. There has been substantial opinion to
the effect that, even though a partnership interest is a capital asset, if
it is not the subject of a "sale or exchange," any loss that results will be
ordinary, not capital .3 Thus, when a partnership interest is forfeited 9
or becomes worthless,40 an ordinary loss deduction may be available, at
34. CODE § § 732, 743, and 754. See generally J. PENNELL & J. O'BYRNE, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION OF PARTNERS AND PARTNERSHIPS 145-59 (1970).
35. Treas. Reg. § 1.708-1(b)(l)(ii) (1960) provides that the contribution of property to
a partnership does not constitute a sale or exchange that could cause its termination. See
also Rev. Rul. 75-423, 1975-2 C.B. 260.
36. CODE § 704(c)(2):
(2) Effect of partnership agreement.-If the partnership agreement so provides,
depreciation, depletion, or gain or loss with respect to property contributed to the
partnership by a partner shall, under regulations prescribed by the Secretary
or his delegate, be shared among the partners so as to take account of the varia-
tion between the basis of the property to the partnership and its fair market
value at the time of contribution.
37. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(c)(2)(i) (1964):
In any case, however, the total depreciation, depletion, or gain or loss allocated to
the partners is limited to a "ceiling" which cannot exceed the amount of gain or loss
realized by the partnership or the depreciation or depletion allowable to it.
38. See 1 A. WILLIS, PARTNERSHIP TAXATION 266-67, 331-33, 487-91 (1976).
39. Gaius G. Gannon, 16 T.C. 1134 (1951), acq., 1951-2 C.B. 2, concerned a partner
who withdrew from the Houston law firm of Baker, Botts, Andrews and Wharton on
December 29, 1944. He had contributed $10,770.42 for a 6.2% interest in the firm, which
was stipulated to be the adjusted cost basis of his partnership interest. In accordance with
the partnership agreement, Gannon forfeited his entire interest in the assets of the firm
because he was withdrawing to continue in the active practice of law. He therefore re-
ceived nothing for his partnership interest upon withdrawal and was returned none of his
contribution of 15 years previous. The court said that although Gannon's interest in the
firm was a capital asset, he had recognized a loss in the amount of $10,770.42 that was an
ordinary loss resulting from a "forfeiture" of that amount rather than a capital loss
occasioned by a "sale or exchange." See also Palmer Hutcheson, 17 T.C. 14 (1951), acq.,
1951-2 C.B. 2.
40. Zeeman v. United States, 275 F. Supp. 235 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), aff'd on other grounds,
395 F.2d 861 (2d Cir. 1968), held that a limited partner in a stock brokerage firm was
entitled to an ordinary loss deduction when her interest became worthless:
The plaintiff's loss is an ordinary loss. While an interest in a limited or general
partnership is a capital asset . . . where the loss materializes from the worthless-
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least in situations in which the partner has no share of partnership
liabilities and receives no consideration for his interest.41 If the aban-
donment of a partnership interest relieves a partner of a share of part-
nership liabilities, even if those liabilities are nonrecourse, 42 he will be
deemed to receive a constructive distribution of cash that will be treated
as a distribution under section 731.43 In short, the relief from liabilities
will be sufficient to support treatment as a "sale or exchange" such that
gains or losses will be capital rather than ordinary.
ness of the interest, without a sale or exchange, the statutory requirements for
capital loss treatment are not met.
275 F. Supp. at 253 (citations omitted). Interestingly, the general partners had agreed to
bear all losses and guaranteed the limited partners the return of their capital contributions.
41. Edward H. Pietz, 59 T.C. 207 (1972), concerned two taxpayers who had been equal
one-third partners with one Grant in the construction and operation of a motel that
proved unsuccessful. The partnership sold the motel for $60,000 in cash, the assumption
of the first mortgage, and a note secured by a second deed of trust, and incurred a slight
gain. The $60,000 in cash was paid to reduce interim financing that had been obtained in
approximately that amount by the taxpayers from their personal line of credit. The note
was given to Grant. The taxpayer-partners received no cash or other assets from the sale
transaction and the partnership was stripped of all its assets and liabilities.
The court held that the sale was part of a plan to liquidate the venture and that the
relief from their liabilities was a distribution to the taxpayers that, by the interplay of
sections 752(b), 731(a) and 741, would be considered as resulting from the "sale or ex-
change" of a partnership interest. The court left unclear what position the Service or it
might take if no relief from liabilities had been involved:
We understand [the Service's] argument to imply that the recognition of the con-
structive distribution is important for characterization purposes only since each
partner's share of the partnership debt is adequately reflected in his partnership
basis. Thus, respondent appears to contend that the constructive distribution will
not alter the amount of the taxpayer's actual loss on liquidation of the partnership,
but will effect only characterization of the loss. It is not clear whether respondent's
position is that subch. K denies taxpayers ordinary losses on all liquidations of
partnership, or whether they are denied ordinary losses only where the liquidation
proceeding involves the satisfaction of existing partnership debts.
59 T.C. at 215 n.ll.
42. Rev. Rul. 74-40, 1974-1 C.B. 159, concerns limited partner L:
Situation 3: Instead of selling his interest L withdraws from the partnership at a
time when the adjusted basis of his interest in the partnership is zero and his pro-
portionate share of partnership liabilities, all of which consist of liabilities on which
neither he, the other partners nor the partnership have assumed any personal liabil-
ity, is $15,000.
Accordingly, L is considered to have received a distribution of money from the
partnership of $15,000 and realizes a gain of $15,000 determined under the provisions
of section 731(a) of the Code.
43. CODE § 752(b):
(b) Decrease in Partner's Liabilities.-Any decrease in a partner's share of the
liabilities of a partnership, or any decrease in a partner's individual liabilities by
reason of the assumption by the partnership of such individual liabilities, shall be
considered as a distribution of money to the partner by the partnership.
See also Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(b) (1960).
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Revenue Ruling 76-18944 must now be reckoned with. It concerned
a partner who purchased a one-third interest in a partnership at the
beginning of the year. During the year the partnership experienced
ordinary losses, part from operations and part from the sale of section
1231 property. The partnership terminated at the end of the year with
no assets or liabilities remaining. The partner clearly was entitled to a
loss to the extent of his remaining basis in his partnership interest,
which had been reduced by his share of partnership losses.4 5 The ques-
tion was whether his loss was ordinary or capital. The Ruling held
that, even though there had been no actual distribution, and even
though the partnership had no remaining liabilities that would trigger
a constructive distribution, the provisions of section 731 apply "as if an
actual distribution had taken place. '" 4 6 Section 731 provides that, in the
case of a liquidating distribution to a partner, loss may be recognized to
the partner to the extent his adjusted basis in his partnership interest
exceeds the amount of money distributed to him.4 7 It further provides
that loss recognized on a liquidating distribution shall be considered as
a loss from the sale or exchange of the distributee partner's partnership
interest5 s that is, as a capital loss. 49
44. 1976-20 I.R.B. 11.
45. A partner's basis in his partnership interest is reduced to the extent he shares in
partnership loss. CODE § 705(a)(2)(A).
46. 1976-20 I.R.B. at 11.
47. CODE § 731(a):
(a) Partners.-In the case of a distribution by a partnership to a partner-
(2) loss shall not be recognized to such partner, except that upon a distribu-
tion in liquidation of a partner's interest in a partnership where no property
other than that described in subparagraph (A) or (B) is distributed to such
partner, loss shall be recognized to the extent of the excess of the adjusted basis
of such partner's interest in the partnership over the sum of-
(A) any money distributed, and
(B) the basis to the distributee, as determined under section 732, of any
unrealized receivables (as defined in section 751(c)) and inventory (as defined
in section 751(d)(2)).
Any gain or loss recognized under this subsection shall be considered as gain
or loss from the sale or exchange of the partnership interest of the distributee
partner.
48. Id.
49. CODE § 741:
In the case of a sale or exchange of an interest in a partnership, gain or loss shall
be recognized to the transferor partner. Such gain or loss shall be considered as gain
or loss from the sale or exchange of a capital asset, except as otherwise provided in
section 751 (relating to unrealized receivables and inventory items which have ap-
preciated substantially in value).
Revenue Ruling 76-189 was cited in Rodman v. Commissioner, 76-2 U.S.T.C. 85,256, 85,258
(2d Cir. 1976), in which the court declined to rule on the Service's position that termination
results in a capital rather than an ordinary loss notwithstanding the absence of a distribu-
tion.
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C. Partnership "Ups" Basis
Section 721 establishes the basic rule that no gain or loss shall be
recognized on the contribution of property to a partnership.50 This rule
applies whether the contribution is made to a partnership in the process
of formation or to one that is already formed and operating. 51 There
are, however, situations in which gain must be recognized. For example,
when property subject to a liability is contributed to a partnership, the
amount of the liability assumed by the partnership shall be treated as a
distribution of cash to the contributing partner.52 If the amount of the
distribution is in excess of his basis in the property contributed, he will
realize gain.5 3
F. C. McDouga14 is a fascinating case in which the taxpayers sought
to establish that gain had been triggered in the process of partnership
formation. A rancher purchased a horse on January 1, 1968 for $10,000
and promised the trainer who recommended the purchase that if he
would train the horse he would receive the standard trainer's fee plus
a half interest in the horse upon the rancher's recovery of acquisition
costs. The horse began to race with success and within a matter of
months attracted offers to purchase as high as $60,000. By October 4,
1968, the rancher had recovered his costs and on that date transferred
a 50% interest in the horse to the trainer. The following day a "Bill of
Sale" was executed that described the transfer as a gift. The trainer
continued to receive the standard training fee after the transfer. The
court found that on November 1, 1968, the rancher and trainer
had concluded a partnership agreement by parol to effectuate their
design of racing the horse for as long as that proved feasible and of
offering him out as a stud thereafter. Profits were to be shared equally
by the [rancher] and the [trainer], while losses were to be allocated to
the [rancher] alone.55
The oral agreement was not reduced to writing until April of 1970.
By amended returns56 the rancher claimed he transferred the half
50. CODE § 721:
No gain or loss shall be recognized to a partnership or to any of its partners in
the case of a contribution of property to the partnership in exchange for an interest
in the partnership.
51. Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(a) (1960).
52. CODE § 752(b); Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(b)(2) (1960).
53. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(c) (1960). Similarly, if a contribution of property is followed
shortly by a distribution, the transaction may be treated as an exchange of property. Treas.
Reg. § 1.731-1(c)(3) (1960).
54. 62 T.C. 720 (1974).
55. 62 T.C. at 722.
56. The parties initially assumed reporting postures different than those reflected in
PARTNERSHIP ALLOCATIONS
interest in the horse as compensation for services and was entitled to a
business expense deduction of $30,000, the value of the half interest
based on the last offer to purchase prior to the transfer. He also re-
ported the $30,000 as an amount realized and claimed long-term capital
gain on the amount by which that exceeded his basis in the half inter-
est.57 Consistent with the rancher's amended reporting posture, the
trainer's amended returns reported the value of the half interest as
ordinary income and further claimed that this inclusion in income gave
him a $30,000 "tax cost basis" in his half interest. Finally, "purporting
to have transferred the horse to a partnership in concert on November
1, 1968," they together claimed that the partnership's basis in the horse
was the sum of the rancher's adjusted basis in the half interest he con-
tributed plus the trainer's $30,000 tax cost basis in the half interest he
contributed. 58 The inclusion of the trainer's tax cost basis led the part-
nership to claim triple the amount of depreciation deductions it had
originally claimed. For 1969, the partnership claimed a depreciation
deduction of $5,602 and reported a loss of $8,911. Pursuant to the part-
nership agreement, the entire loss was allocated to the rancher.
The court held for the taxpayers on all points, except that it found
that the partnership was created by the October 4 transfer rather than
by the November 1 oral agreement. It rejected the Service's argument
that the partnership's depreciable basis in the horse was limited to the
rancher's basis at the time of his contribution: 51
When on the formation of a joint venture a party contributing
appreciated assets satisfies an obligation by granting his obligee a
the amended returns. The rancher initially claimed no deduction by reason of the transfer
of the half interest to the trainer. The trainer initially reported additional gross income in
the amount of $5,000 that he identified as a gift interest in a racehorse.
57. The rancher reported a $25,000 gain on the transfer by charging all depreciation
deductions for the period prior to the transfer against his $5,000 basis in the half interest
he retained. The court said that the depreciation for those months would have to be allo-
cated between the half interest retained and the half interest transferred to the trainer.
58. The partnership's basis in contributed property is the contributing partner's ad-
justed basis in the property at the time of contribution. CODE § 723. The 1976 Act amends
CODE § 723 to specify that the partnership's basis shall include the amount of gain recog-
nized to the contributing partner:
The basis of property contributed to a partnership by a partner shall be the ad-
justed basis of such property to the contributing partner at the time of the contribu-
tion increased by the amount (if any) of gain recognized to the contributing partner
at such time.
1976 Act § 2131(c).
59. The Service had also argued that the transaction was a gift. The court rejected the
gift analysis and was "undeterred in so doing by the fact that petitioners originally char-
acterized the transfer as a gift" because the relationship of the parties "was essentially of a
business nature." 62 T.C. at 724-25.
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capital interest in the venture, he is deemed first to have transferred
to the obligee an undivided interest in the assets contributed, equal
in value to the amount of the obligation so satisfied. He and the
obligee are deemed thereafter and in concert to have contributed those
assets to the joint venture. 60
The logic of this two-step analysis resulted in the holding that the
partnership's basis in the horse included the trainer's "tax cost basis" in
the half interest he contributed.
The court's explanation of its decision that the rancher was entitled
to a $30,000 business expense deduction is both curious and significant.
It began by stating:
When an interest in a joint venture is transferred as compensation
for services rendered, any deduction which may be authorized under
section 162(a)(1) by reason of that transfer is properly claimed by the
party to whose benefit the services accrued, be that party the venture
itself or one or more venturers .... 61
It reasoned that until the trainer received his interest, the rancher was
the "sole" owner of the horse and recipient of its earnings and no joint
venture existed. The court's conclusion that the rancher "alone could
have benefited from the services rendered" prior to the transfer is less
than obvious. Every dollar of winnings from the trainer's efforts brought
him closer to the transfer of the half interest in a horse that had rapidly
and substantially appreciated in value. The court's reasoning is signif-
icant because it could be applied in the case of a person who receives an
interest in partnership profits as compensation for services.62 It has been
suggested that the partnership deduction for the payment of the profits
interest may be specially allocated to the recipient partner so he will not
have to pay tax on a receipt that does not result in cash in hand.63
McDougal appears to suggest that such an approach is inappropriate
because it allocates the deduction away from those who bear the burden
and reap the benefit.
The court apparently did not question the appropriateness of the
allocation of the entire 1969 partnership loss to the rancher. However,
it did object to the extent to which the rancher had claimed deprecia-
tion. It held that the partnership had been formed on October 4, not on
60. 62 T.C. at 725.
61. 62 T.C. at 728.
62. See, e.g., Cowan, Receipt of a Partnership Interest for Services 1974-2 N.Y.U. 32D
INST. ON FED. TAX. 1501.
63. Boffa, Tax Problems in Compensating the joint Venture Partner, 1 J. RZAL EST.
TAx. 131,142 (1974).
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November 1, and that the rancher "was entitled to claim depreciation"
on the horse
only until the transfer of October 4, 1968. Thereafter depreciation...
ought to have been deducted by the joint venture in the computation
of its taxable income.64
The holding that the rancher was not entitled to claim depreciation
after the formation of the partnership is tantamount to a holding that it
would be inappropriate, absent further facts, for the partnership to
specially allocate all depreciation to him. The fact that the rancher re-
ported all depreciation during the initial stage of the partnership's life
reflected an informal special allocation of depreciation. McDougal,
therefore, is at least some authority for the proposition that a partner
who agrees to bear all economic losses may be allocated the entire
amount of the partnership's overall tax loss, but may not be allocated all
depreciation deductions independent of other items of income or loss.6 5
III. PRIOR TO THE TAX REFORM ACT
A. The Orrisch Case
The basic pre-1976 Act rules of partnership allocations can be stated
simply. In general, partners are free to determine in their partnership
agreement how the various economic and tax consequences of partner-
ship operations will be allocated.66 The partnership agreement includes
any amendments that are made up until the time required for filing the
partnership return.6 7 Allocations in the partnership agreement will not
be disregarded for tax purposes unless their "principal purpose" is the
"avoidance or evasion" of tax. 8 In the event an allocation is disre-
garded, the subject of the disregarded allocation will be reallocated
among the partners in accordance with their ratio for sharing the "tax-
able income or loss of the partnership, as described in section 702(a)(9)
"69
The most striking aspect of the principal purpose limitation is that
it is an extremely undeveloped concept. There is relatively little author-
ity to explain its precise application in the wide variety of situations in
which it can be called into play. The difficulty it has presented to practi-
64. 62 T.C. at 726.
65. See the discussion of bottom-line allocations in the text accompanying notes 146-68
infra.
66. CODE § 704(a).
67. CODE § 761(c).
68. CODE § 704(b)(2).
69. CODE § 704(b).
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tioners has been compounded by the refusal of the Service to issue ad-
vance rulings on whether it will be satisfied in a proposed transaction.0
The legislative history of the provision indicates little more than that
partners were to have substantial leeway to determine allocations among
themselves and that they were to be permitted to share income in a dif-
ferent manner than they share in losses.71 Perhaps the most frequently
quoted indication of legislative intent is the language in the Report of
the Senate Committe on Finance that explained the principal purpose
limitation, in part, as follows:
Where, however, a provision in a partnership agreement for a special
allocation of certain items has a substantial economic effect and is not
merely a device for reducing the taxes of certain partners without
actually affecting their shares of partnership income, then such a pro-
vision will be recognized for tax purposes.7 2
The Regulations state that an allocation must be considered "in
relation to all the surrounding facts and circumstances" to determine
whether the principal purpose limitation has been violated, and list
several factors to be considered. Perhaps because of the Senate Report
language just quoted, there appears to have emerged a general senti-
ment that the most important of the factors identified in the Regula-
tions is "whether the allocation has 'substantial economic effect', that is,
whether the allocation may actually affect the dollar amount of the
partners' shares of the total partnership income or loss independently of
tax consequences. '" 73 Surprisingly little attention has been given to the
70. Rev. Proc. 74-22, 1974-2 C.B. 476.
71. Both the House and Senate Reports contain the following statement:
In the case of a partnership where there is a different ratio for sharing income than
that applicable for sharing losses, the income ratio shall be applicable if the partner-
ship has taxable income in the partnership taxable year, and the loss ratio shall be
applicable in any year in which the partnership has a loss.
H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954); S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954).
72. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 379 (1954).
73. The Regulations state the following are among the relevant circumstances in de-
termining whether the principal purpose of an allocation in a partnership agreement is
for the avoidance or evasion of federal income tax:
Whether the partnership or a partner individually has a business purpose for the
allocation; whether the allocation has "substantial economic effect", that is, whether
the allocation may actually affect the dollar amount of the partners' shares of the
total partnership income or loss independently of tax consequences; whether related
items of income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit from the same source are subject to
the same allocation; whether the allocation was made without recognition of normal
business factors and only after the amount of the specially allocated item could
reasonably be estimated; the duration of the allocation; and the overall tax conse-
quences of the allocation.
Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2) (1964).
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admonition in the Regulations to consider whether "the partnership or
a partner individually has a business purpose for the allocation" and
whether "related items of income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit from
the same source are subject to the same allocation." 74
Perhaps because of the preoccupation with "substantial economic
effect," practitioners frequently assume that the principal purpose lim-
itation is satisfied if the allocation in question bears some immediate
relation to any economic dimension of the partnership. Whether this is
or will remain the truth is the subject of all the discussion that follows.
What must be addressed at the outset is the unfortunate tendency to
assume that an allocation will have some economic effect if it has impact
on the partnership's capital accounts. Such a notion should not have
survived Stanley C. Orrisch,7 5 the leading case on partnership alloca-
tions. Orrisch illustrates one critical point that cannot be overempha-
sized: a partnership's capital accounts may have no economic signif-
icance.75
Orrisch involved two husband and wife couples, the Orrisches and
the Crisafis, who in 1963 entered into a partnership in which everything
was to be divided on a 50-50 basis. The Orrisches contributed $26,500
in cash and the Crisafis contributed $12,500 in cash, and the partnership
purchased two apartment houses that were paid for almost entirely with
borrowed funds. In 1966 the Crisafis, who had substantial tax losses
from other sources and had not reported taxable income at any time
during the life of the partnership, orally agreed that for 1966 and sub-
sequent years all of the depreciation deductions of the partnership
would be allocated to the Orrisches, who were in need of tax losses. The
Orrisches' capital account was lowered by the amount of the deprecia-
tion deductions allocated to them, with the result that their capital ac-
count was reduced far below that of the Crisafis.
The examples in the Regulations that illustrate the application of these tests indicate
that an allocation will not be disregarded simply because it results in a tax savings to all
partners. On the other hand, the fact the parties would not have entered a transaction
without a particular allocation does not mean it will be found to have substantial economic
effect apart from tax consequences. The tests are best viewed as interrelated avenues of
inquiry to determine all of the economic consequences of a particular allocation.
74. Id.
75. 55 T.C. 395 (1970), afj'd per curiam, 31 A.F.T.R.2d 73-1069 (9th Cir. 1973).
76. Nor does a partner's capital account necessarily reflect his basis in his partnership
interest. See Treas. Reg. § 1.705-1(a)(1) (1956):
The adjusted basis of a partner's interest in a partnership is determined without re-
gard to any amount shown in the partnership books as the partner's "capital",
"equity", or similar account. For example, A contributes property with an adjusted
basis to him of $400 (and a value of $1,000) to a partnership. B contributes $1,000
cash. While under their agreement each may have a "capital account" in the partner-
ship of $1,000, the adjusted basis of A's interest is only $400 and B's interest, $1,000.
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The Tax Court found that the Orrisches had agreed to pay tax on
any gain that might occur on the sale of partnership property to the
extent they had been specially allocated what otherwise would have
been the Crisafis' half of the depreciation deductions. However, the
court also found that the charges of depreciation against the Orrisches'
capital account had no economic significance. Operating profits and
losses, computed without regard to depreciation, continued to be di-
vided equally. Similarly, the proceeds of any sale of partnership prop-
erty would still be divided equally. Under normal accounting principles,
the court said, the disparity in capital accounts caused by the special
allocation of depreciation would be treated as a debt to the partnership
or would affect the division of proceeds in the event of sale of the part-
nership assets. However, it found no indication that the parties intended
normal accounting principles to control the significance of their capital
accounts. No debt was intended and the proceeds of any sale of partner-
ship property would continue to be divided equally.7 7 In short, the only
significance of the charge of specially allocated depreciation against the
Orrisches' capital account was that it reflected the extent to which the
Orrisches would absorb the Crisafis' tax bill in the event the property
were sold at a gain.
It is therefore clear that the special allocation of depreciation failed,
in the words of the Regulations, to "actually affect the dollar amount of
the partners' shares of the total partnership income or loss indepen-
dently of tax consequences.."7 8 However, the court went beyond a recita-
tion of the tests in the Regulations and attempted to clarify the basic
meaning of the principal purpose limitation. It explained the "sub-
stantial economic effect" language in the Senate Report as follows:
This reference to "substantial economic effect" did not appear in the
House Ways and Means Committee report ... and was apparently
added in the Senate Finance Committee to allay fears that special al-
77. Orrisch is strikingly similar to Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2), Example (1) (1964):
Example (1). The provisions of a partnership agreement for a year in which the
partnership incurs losses on the sale of depreciable property used in the trade or
business are amended to allocate such losses to one partner who has no such gains
individually. An equivalent amount of partnership loss or deduction of a different
character is allocated to other partners who individually have gains from the sale
of depreciable property used in the trade or business. Since the purpose and effect of
this allocation is solely to reduce the taxes of certain partners without actually af-
fecting their shares of partnership income, such allocation will not be recognized.
The only major difference is that the Crisafis did not immediately receive deductions of
a different character (they did not appear to need deductions of any character for the
years in question), but were to be relieved of tax burden on the sale of the property at a
gain to the extent the Orrisches had been specially allocated depreciation.
78. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2) (1964).
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locations of income or deductions would be denied effect in every case
where the allocation resulted in a reduction in the income tax liabil-
ities of one or more of the partners. The statement is an affirmation
that special allocations are ordinarily to be recognized if they have a
business validity apart from their tax consequences. 9
The court said the special allocation to the Orrisches "was adopted for
a tax-avoidance rather than a business purpose" and "did not reflect
normal business considerations but was designed primarily to minimize
the overall tax liabilities of the partners." 0 The depreciation was there-
fore reallocated according to "taxable income or loss of the partnership,
as described in section 702(a)(9),"'11 that is, according to the partners'
50-50 ratio for sharing general profits or losses.
The court's emphasis on business purpose is somewhat clouded be-
cause of its roundabout response to the Orrisches' assertion that the
purpose of the special allocation of depreciation was to compensate
them for their greater economic investment in the enterprise. The court
stated that the evidence did not support the "contention" that the spe-
cial allocation had been adopted "in order to equalize the capital ac-
counts of the partners.""2 Its reasoning was simple: equalization of cap-
ital accounts could not have been the goal because the special allocation
of depreciation sent the capital account of the Orrisches further below
the capital account of the Crisafis than it previously had been above it.
The court's discussion of the increased disparity in capital accounts is
confusing because the Orrisches did not argue that their goal was to
equalize capital accounts per se.13 Their argument was one that would
have to be refuted by something more than simple subtraction.
79. 55 T.C. at 400-01 (citations omitted).
80. Id. at 401.
81. CODE § 704(b). The application of the reallocation mechanism is slightly more
complicated in the case of certain "bottom-line" allocations. See text accompanying notes
164-68 infra.
82. 55 T.C. at 401-02.
83. The capital accounts in Orrisch did not accurately reflect current economic invest-
ment in the partnership, nor did they accurately reflect tax basis, nor were they the basis
for any allocation ratios. They reflected all cash contributions, withdrawals and distribu-
tions, all items of partnership taxable income and loss, but did not include partners' shares
of partnership liabilities. There is no uniform rule on the composition of capital accounts,
and the computation used in Orrisch is not uncommon, particularly among partnerships
that have no allocation ratios based on capital accounts. Such a computation produces a
figure that does not accurately reflect tax basis because the partners' shares of partnership
liabilities are not included. Actual economic investment is not reflected because tax losses
are deducted. For example, under the Orrisch system, if partner A were to contribute
$100 additional cash to the partnership, his capital account would be increased by $100, as
would his actual economic investment in the enterprise. If he were then to receive a "pass-
through" of $100 of partnership tax losses, his capital account would be lowered by $100,
1977]
FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Recall that the Orrisches had initially contributed twice the amount
of cash that had been contributed by the Crisafis. The Orrisches' real
argument was that the special allocation of depreciation was an attempt
to equalize the capital investments of the partners, not their capital
accounts.5 4 The two are not necessarily the same. Capital accounts often
involve a strange mixture of apples and oranges, at least from an in-
vestor's point of view. Consider, for example, the taxpayer in the 50%
bracket who contributes $100 in cash and receives in return a $100
credit on his capital account. If he subsequently is allocated a $100 de-
preciation deduction, his capital account (at least under the system used
in Orrisch) is reduced to zero. But he would not consider that his entire
capital investment has been returned to him. Rather, he would consider
that his investment has been returned only to the extent of the $50
saving on his tax bill that resulted from the depreciation deduction. So,
too, with the Orrisches. Although their capital account was lowered by
the full amount of depreciation allocated to them, their cash investment
was returned in only a fraction of that amount, depending on their tax
bracket. Indeed, the total amount of depreciation specially allocated to
the Orrisches in the years in question would not have been sufficient to
return them their excess capital investment had they been in the 50%
bracket. Therefore, the increased disparity in capital accounts did not
negate an intention to equalize economic investment, and the question
remained whether the approach adopted was permissible.
The court directly addressed this issue in a footnote that indicated
its appreciation of the fact that the capital accounts in Orrisch did not
accurately reflect the economic investment of the partners:
We recognize that petitioners had more money invested in the
partnership than the Crisafis and that it is reasonable for the partners
to endeavor to equalize their investments, since each one was to share
equally in the profits and losses of the enterprise. However, we do not
think that sec. 704(a) permits the partners' prospective tax benefits to
be used as the medium for equalizing their investments, and it is
apparent that the economic burden of the depreciation (which is
not merely by the actual dollar amount the loss would save him on his tax bill, which is
the true measure of the reduction of his actual economic investment in the partnership.
Therefore, the Orrisches had no reason to equalize capital accounts per se.
84. Brief for Appellant at 9, Orrisch v. Commissioner, 31 A.F.T.R.2d 1069 (9th Cir.
1973):
The Tax Court in its decision finds it incredible that equalization of the capital
accounts was the objective of the special allocation. Clearly, the Tax Court misread
the evidence, for nowhere is this stated to be the objective; rather the evidence
states that the depreciation was allocated because of the inequity in the capital and
the likelihood of Orrisch having to put in more money.
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reflected by the allowance for depreciation) was not intended to be
the medium used.8 5
The court, therefore, admitted that the increased disparity in capital
accounts did not negate the possibility that equalization of investment
was the goal of the special allocation. More importantly, it held that
equalization of investment could not be accomplished in the manner
attempted.
Orrisch therefore contains a strong suggestion that initial contribu-
tion to capital is not an appropriate determinant of the allocation of
depreciation deductions if initial capital contributions do not also con-
trol the allocation of any of the economic benefits or burdens of the
partnership. Stated differently, depreciation deductions may not be
allocated according to the ratio of what the partners put in to the part-
nership unless that ratio also determines the allocation of some eco-
nomic incident of what the partners pull out of the partnership. More
specifically, it is not persuasive to assert that the substantial business
purpose of an allocation of depreciation is to compensate selected
partners for their greater cash investment if the allocations of partner-
ship cash benefits fail to reflect a similar purpose. This analysis need not
be confined to allocations of depreciation deductions. It would appear
to be equally applicable to allocations of overall partnership loss. Con-
sider, for example, the fairly common situation of the partnership that
has a positive cash flow yet reports a tax loss that is entirely due to de-
preciation deductions.8 6 It would seem that the same principles should
85. 55 T.C. at 402 n.5.
86. In an investment in depreciable real estate, taxable income will be less than net
cash flow in any year in which the depreciation deduction claimed exceeds the amount of
cash spent to retire the principal on outstanding indebtedness. Stated differently, taxable
income will be less than the net amount of cash actually produced whenever the deduction
for the non-cash expense of depreciation exceeds the amount of money actually spent to
amortize indebtedness, a cash expense for which there is no corresponding deduction. The
essential point is that there is a gap between actual cash expenditures for which there is
no current deduction and deductions that are available without actual cash expenditures.
An investment in depreciable real estate produces tax losses notwithstanding net cash flow
whenever the depreciation deduction is greater than the sum of net cash flow plus the
amount of principal paid on indebtedness-when, after the depreciation deduction is
applied to "shelter" from tax net cash flow and debt amortization, surplus depreciation
deductions remain.
Consider, for example, an apartment house that, in a given year, has $10,000 in rent
receipts, $500 in real estate taxes, $400 in maintenance expenses, $900 repayment of
principal on indebtedness, $8,000 payment of interest on indebtedness, and a $1,200 de-
preciation deduction. The net cash flow of the property is as follows:
NCF = RR - RT- ME- (P + I )
= $10,000 - 500 - 400 - (900 + 8,000)
NCF = $200
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apply as apply to the allocation of depreciation itself.8 7 Stated differ-
ently, there is nothing about the Orrisch opinion that suggests that it
applies only to naked allocations of all depreciation and not to alloca-
tions of tax losses that represent the surplus depreciation that remains
after depreciation has first been applied to shelter net cash flow and debt
amortization from tax.
If this interpretation is correct and not simply the product of path-
ological conservatism, the next question is what must be done to the
special allocation of depreciation, or to the allocation of overall partner-
ship loss, to enable it to pass muster under the principal purpose limita-
tion. Is it sufficient to correlate it either with net cash flow, with pro-
ceeds of refinancing, or with proceeds in the event of sale of partnership
property? Or is one of these economic incidents more important than
the other, depending on the situation? There is no clear answer to these
questions,"" but the court in Orrisch suggested that the allocation would
have been upheld if it had had some impact on the distribution of
proceeds in the event of sale of partnership property:
To find any economic effect of the special allocation agreement
aside from its tax consequences, we must, therefore, look to see who is
to bear the economic burden of the depreciation if the buildings
should be sold for a sum less than their original cost.89
If this is a general rule, does it apply in the case of an highly leveraged
property? The fact that the buildings in Orrisch were heavily encum-
bered may indicate that the answer is yesY0 If so, the allocation of net
The taxable income or loss of the property can be stated in terms of net cash flow as
follows:
TI = NCF - D + P
= $200 - 1,200 + 900
TI = ($100)
The two adjustments made to net cash flow to arrive at the $100 tax loss are necessary
because of the conversion from a cash dimension to a tax dimension. Net cash flow is, most
simply, cash in minus cash out. Monies spent to repay principal on indebtedness constitute
cash out and hence are subtracted in the computation of net cash flow. However, principal
repayment is a cash expense for which there is no deduction, and hence must be added
back on to net cash flow when converting net cash flow to taxable income or loss. Con-
versely, depreciation deductions do not enter into the computation of net cash flow be-
cause they have no current cash reality. They do, however, have tax reality and must be
subtracted from net cash flow when converting net cash flow to taxable income or loss.
87. But see the discussion of McDougal, text accompanying notes 54-65 supra.
88. See the discussion of the new reallocation mechanism of the 1976 Act, text ac-
companying notes 222-23 infra.
89. 55 T.C. at 403.
90. See McGuire, When Will A Special Allocation Among Partners Be Recognized? 37
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cash flow could continue independent of the allocation of depreciation
or overall loss.
On the other hand, reliance on the Orrisch dictum may be mis-
placed. There are two basic ways in which an allocation of depreciation
can be grounded on proceeds of sale of partnership property. First, spe-
cial allocations of depreciation may be applied to reduce the extent to
which the recipients of the depreciation share in sale proceeds. He who
receives $100 of depreciation shall have his share of sale proceeds re-
duced by $100. This is the general approach suggested by the Orrisch
dictum. On the one hand, it appears initially to have economic effect.
On the other, it does not appear to have a business purpose. It is dif-
ficult to argue that a special allocation of depreciation is a reward for
greater capital contribution if the allocation has the effect of reducing
the recipient's share of sale proceeds. Second, the allocation of sale pro-
ceeds may be made in accordance with the allocation of depreciation.
He who receives 80% of the depreciation deductions shall receive 80%
of sale proceeds. The "reward" argument is more persuasive in this
second type of arrangement. However, under either approach, the real-
ities of an highly leveraged real estate partnership may suggest that tax
avoidance eclipses business purpose if the allocation of depreciation or
overall loss is correlated only with proceeds of sale. Most, if not all, of
sale proceeds may be applied to retire outstanding mortgage financing.
In such a situation, the allocation of sale proceeds may be little more
than a paper allocation. Similarly, substantial debt service requirements
may render net cash flow minimal or nonexistent. Therefore, the true
interest in cash benefits would lie in the partners' ratio for sharing re-
financing proceeds. In conclusion, the safest possible approach is to cor-
relate the allocation of depreciation or overall loss in accordance with at
least some portion of what will be, in the partnership in question, a
meaningful measure of anticipated cash benefits.
B. "Soft Money" Allocations
Special allocations of "soft money" items are extremely common.
"Soft" money or dollars are those applied to expenses that are currently
deductible. The issue is whether the partnership may allocate the de-
duction to particular partners on the ground that their contributions
were used to meet the expenditures. For example, if, upon admission to
a partnership, our much-maligned 50% bracket investor can have his
entire cash contribution applied to a deductible expenditure and be
J. TAx. 74 (1972), for the opinion of a very able commentator to the effect that an al-
teration in the allocation of proceeds of xefinancing or sale would have been sufficient to
support the special allocation of all the depreciation to the Orrisches.
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allocated the entire corresponding deduction, the result is an immediate
return to him of half his cash investment in the form of savings on his
tax bill. The overall desirability of such an allocation is enhanced if his
fellow partners have no need for the deduction.
As is true in other areas of partnership allocations, there is relatively
little authority on soft money allocations. Perhaps the most frequently
cited is Example 5 of the principal purpose Regulations,"' which con-
cerns a partnership formed by G and H to develop and market elec-
tronic devices. H contributed $2,500 in cash and his full-time services
and G contributed $100,000 in cash and the promise to obtain a loan for
the partnership of any additional funds needed. Their agreement pro-
vides that all research expenditures and any interest on partnership
loans are to be charged to G. It also allocates to G 90% of partnership
income or loss, computed without reduction by such research and inter-
est expenditures, until all loans have been repaid and G has been re-
turned all research and interest expenditures, plus his share of any
partnership operating losses. Thereafter, G and H are to share profits
and losses equally.
Example 5 permits all research expense and interest deductions to
be allocated to G because those expenses "are in fact borne by G." It is
significant that G's priority on return until his recovery of expenses did
not prevent the allocation to him of all deductions generated by those
expenses. The rationale, presumably, is that G bears the economic risk
that partnership operations will not be successful enough to reimburse
him. In this connection, Example 5 requires a broad word of caution.
Construed most narrowly, it concerns only the classic combination of
the service partner and the money partner who bears almost all of the
cash investment risk of the enterprise and receives a special allocation of
the deductions for categories of expenses he alone shoulders. It does not
authorize money partners to freely trace their contributions to whatever
expenditures comport with their individual tax pictures and claim the
particular deductions, gains, losses, or increase in bases that result.92
Example 5 also requires a note of caution in connection with lim-
ited partnerships that own leveraged depreciable property. The use of
an initial high sharing ratio to return a greater cash contribution of
some sort is frequently referred to as a "pay-back period." Pay-back
periods are often used to allocate high percentages of early years' tax
losses to limited partners. Perhaps most typically, limited partners are
allocated an extremely high percentage of partnership taxable income
or loss until they have been returned a specified percentage of their
91. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2), Example 5 (1964).
92. See id., Example 3 (1964).
PARTNERSHIP ALLOCATIONS
initial capital contributions. Although the allocation may be stated in
terms of taxable income or loss in the alternative, the early years of the
partnership will most commonly produce tax losses, not taxable income.
Indeed, partnership tax losses in early years are likely to far exceed those
in later years because accelerated depreciation methods will bunch de-
ductions in early years and because only a small portion of debt service
in those years will be attributable to the non-deductible expense of re-
payment of principal.
The result can be contrasted with the situation in Example 5. The
latter concerned a special allocation of deductions in the amount of
actual cash expenditures to the partner who made them. The losses
allocated to the limited partners during the pay-back period, on the
other hand, are likely to be far in excess of partnership cash expendi-
tures, because of depreciation deductions, and far in excess of the dollar
amount of the initial capital contributions of the limited partners. The
reason is, of course, that depreciation is computed on the basis of total
acquisition cost, even if the property is acquired entirely with borrowed
funds.93 The limited partners may deduct losses in excess of their actual
cash investment to the extent they share in the partnership's non-
recourse liabilities.9 4 Indeed, it is not uncommon for limited partners
to be allocated losses in excess of their actual cash investment in the first
two years of the partnership. 95 It is true that the losses may in part re-
flect actual cash expenditures, such as interest payments, but those ex-
penses, especially after the partnership's initial year, will typically be
made from partnership gross receipts and not traceable to the contribu-
tions of the limited partners. This situation shall be considered more
extensively in the discussion below of bottom-line allocations. 96 The
short of it for the moment is that the priority on partnership losses
should conservatively be correlated with something more than the initial
capital contributions of the limited partners. As a practical matter, this
may be required in any event. For example, Blue Sky commissioners
may insist on a pay-back period that gives the limited partners a prior-
ity on net cash flow that corresponds with their priority on partnership
losses.9
93. Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947); Manuel Mayerson, 47 T.C. 340 (1966).
94. CODE §§ 704(d) and 752(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1960).
95. See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 74-17, 1974-1 C.B. 438, in which the Service refused to issue
advance rulings on tax classification unless:
The aggregate deductions to be claimed by the partners as their distributive
shares of partnership losses for the first two years of operation of the limited part-
nership will not exceed the amount of equity capital invested in the limited partner-
ship.
96. See text accompanying notes 146-68 infra.
97. See, e.g., 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 4821, Midwest Securities Commissioners As-
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Revenue Ruling 66-18798 is relevant to soft money allocations even
though it involved an allocation of tax-preferred income rather than ex-
pense deductions. It concerned a partnership formed to acquire and
distribute a single issue of tax-exempt municipal bonds. Each partner
subscribed for a portion of the bond issue and was obligated to pay for
its proportionate share of any bonds remaining unsold on termination
of the syndicate. However, the funds advanced by the partners to enable
the syndicate to acquire the bonds,, which they treated as contributions
to capital and not as loans, were not in proportion to their participa-
tion.99 Upon termination of the syndicate, net profit or loss was allo-
cated among the members in proportion to their participation, but the
tax-exempt interest that accrued on the bonds during the existence of
the syndicate was allocated among the members who advanced the
funds to acquire the bonds. The Ruling upheld the allocation, stating
that it had "substantial economic effect" because it allocated "the bond
interest to those members who in fact provided the funds to purchase
the bond issues."'100
The Ruling can be interpreted as additional support for soft money
allocations because it permitted the partners, each of whom could have
been required under their agreement to contribute his pro rata share of
the front money, to decide among themselves who would actually supply
the front money and receive the tax-exempt income. Because the part-
ners actually received the cash benefit of that income, it would have
sociation, STATEMENT OF POLiCY REGARDING REAL ESTATE PROGRAMS IV E (July 22, 1975):
E. Promotional Interest. An interest in the limited partnership will be allowed as
a promotional interest and partnership management fee, provided the amount or
percentage of such interest is reasonable. Such an interest will be considered pre-
sumptively reasonable if it is within the limitations expressed in either subparagraph
1 or 2 below:
1. An interest equal to 25% in the undistributed cash amounts remaining after
payment to investors of an amount equal to 100% of capital contribution; or
2. An interest equal to:
(i) 10% of distributions from cash available for distribution; and
(ii) 15% of cash distributions to investors from the proceeds remaining from the
sale or refinancing of properties after payment to investors of an amount equal to
100% of capital contributions, plus an amount equal to 6% of capital contributions
per annum cumulative, less the sum of prior distributions to investors from cash
available for distribution.
3. For purposes of this Section, the capital contribution of the investors shall
only be reduced by a cash distribution to investors of the proceeds from the sale or
refinancing of properties.
98. 1966-2 C.B. 246.
99. Although the syndicate manager could require members to contribute their pro-
portionate shares of any deposits that had to be made on the bonds and any amounts
necessary to carry them, he had discretion to raise the necessary funds however he wished,
subject to the right of each partner to furnish its proportionate share.
100. 1966-2 C.B. at 248.
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been difficult to state under the facts given that the allocation lacked
business purpose or substantial economic effect and should be disre-
garded. On the other hand, if it were shown that the allocation of the
profit or loss on the resale of the bonds was amended to reflect the
earlier allocation of tax-exempt income, the arrangement would pre-
sumably be held to involve an impermissible juggling of tax conse-
quences without the requisite business purpose or economic effect."°"
The greatest significance of the Ruling may lie in its use of the term
"special allocation." It proceeded from the partners' characterization of
the voluntary advances as capital contributions to describe the alloca-
tion of tax-exempt income based thereon as a "special allocation." To
emphasize: even though the allocation was based on the partners' initial
capital contributions, it was treated as a special allocation; that is, an
allocation that is subject to the principal purpose limitation. It was
special because it was not in accordance with the partners' overall shar-
ing ratio. The Ruling, therefore, echoes the note of warning sounded in
Orrisch to the effect that an allocation of tax benefits may be subject to
being disregarded under the principal purpose limitation even though
it runs in favor of partners who have made greater initial contributions
to capital.
Revenue Ruling 68-1391°2 involved a soft money allocation of the
entire contribution of two partners. The ABC partnership was formed
when B and C each received a portion of A's working interest in oil and
gas leases for their promise to contribute equal amounts to drill and
equip the partnership's first test well. The partnership elected to ex-
pense intangible drilling and development cost, 10 3 and B and C made
their contributions as various stages of completion were reached. Their
entire contribution was spent drilling the well and- was sufficient to
complete it.
The partnership agreement provided that all items of cost were to
be allocated to the partners in accordance with their portion of the
contributions to the respective items of cost. In determining contribu-
tions to intangible drilling and development costs, the initial pay-
ments of B and C made pursuant to the partnership agreement,
would, to the extent so expended, represent their respective contribu-
tions to the intangible drilling and development costs incurred by the
partnership. 0 4
101. Compare Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2), Example 3 (1964).
102. 1968-1 C.B. 311.
103. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.612-4(a) (1965) and 1.703-1(b)(1) (1974).
104. 1968-1 C.B. at 311.
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The Ruling said that allocation of the intangible drilling and develop-
ment costs to B and C would be recognized "unless examination dis-
closes that the principal purpose of the allocation is the avoidance or
evasion of Federal income tax." 105
The Ruling may not constitute as strong authority in support of
soft money allocations as it initially appears. Its scope is vague because
so few facts are presented. One is left to wonder what further facts
might be revealed that would indicate a violation of the principal pur-
pose limitation. For example, the Ruling does not specify whether A's
capital investment was prior to or contemporaneous with the admission
of B and C.- ° It did state that B and C each received a 3/32 working
interest and that A "retained the remaining 26/32 working interest."
Therefore, there is a suggestion that A's investment was prior to that of
B and C and that A was in need of funds to complete the test well. This
may explain why the Ruling referred to the "business purpose" test in
upholding the allocation. On the other hand, it also fails to identify the
relative tax pictures of the partners. The point of peering down the
mouth of this gift-horse Ruling is to suggest that the Service might not
reach the same decision if it were clear that the contributions of the
partners were contemporaneous and that A was allocating the soft
money items to high-bracket investors when he had little or no need for
the deductions.
S. Rex Lewis1 0 7 is perhaps the most recent and the most striking
victory for soft money allocations. Taxpayer Lewis was a practicing at-
torney who also had a one-half interest in Howard and Lewis Invest-
ments (HLI), a partnership organized to invest in real estate. HLI be-
came an equal participant with Anchorage in the ownership of an
apartment complex.
As a precondition to HLI's participation in the... project, it was
agreed that [Lewis] and Howard would pay the first $80,000 of inter-
est to accrue on the construction loan.10
At a December 28 loan closing, $80,000 of interest was prepaid with
funds produced by Lewis and Howard. The entire deduction for this
expense was allocated to HLI, that is, to Lewis and Howard.
The Service persuaded the Tax Court that HLI and Anchorage
were, for federal income tax purposes, not mere coowners but partners
whose sharing ratio was 50-50. The Service had fought for this result
105. 1968-1 C.B. at 312. Compare Treas. Reg. § 1.704-I(b)(2), Example 3 (1964).
106. Indeed, it did not specify that A had made any capital investment.
107. 65 T.C. 625 (1975).
108. Id. at 633.
PARTNERSHIP ALLOCATIONS
to apply the principal purpose limitation to the allocation of the entire
prepaid interest deduction to HLI.
The record discloses that HLI's relationship with Anchorage en-
tailed considerably more than the simple coownership of property.
Anchorage was responsible for the management of the [project] and
was compensated for its services out of the gross rents realized on the
complex. In the management of the complex by Anchorage we per-
ceive sufficient business activity to support the conclusion that a part-
nership did exist in which HLI's distributive share was 50 percent.10 9
The Service's victory on the classification issue was somewhat Pyrrhic
because the court went on to hold that the principal purpose limitation
had not been violated. It sustained the allocation to HLI of the prepaid
interest deductions "because the economic burden of them was borne
by [Lewis] and Howard. 110
Lewis is striking because a large portion of the prepayment of inter-
est had clearly been made for tax purposes and not for business pur-
poses. Only $36,000 of the $80,000 prepayment of interest made at the
December 28 closing was required by the lender to be made at that
time. The remaining $44,000 was a voluntary prepayment by HLI of
the bulk of the interest that would accrue the following year."1 Further-
more, the entire $80,000 prepayment was made with funds borrowed by
Lewis and Howard. Most significantly, the court found that "no ad-
vantages were secured by prepaying $44,000 of interest. "112 The court
treated these facts as of no consequence once it determined that the
deduction itself would not be disallowed as a material distortion of in-
come or on other grounds." 3 In short, even though the $44,000 soft
money payment had been made entirely for tax advantage, once the
deduction itself passed muster it was appropriate to allocate it to the
partners who bore the expense. It did appear that Anchorage needed
109. Id. at 632. There are too few facts in the opinion to support an attempt to
reconcile Lewis with Rev. Rul. 75-374, 1975-2 C.B. 261, which stated that coowners of an
apartment project can provide customary services without being deemed a partnership for
tax purposes.
110. 65 T.C. at 633.
111. The $44,000 was deductible only to the extent it was not refundable.
112. 65 T.C. at 631. Compare James A. Collins, 54 T.C. 1656 (1970).
113. For a discussion of Lewis as a prepaid interest case, see Weary and Wilbert, How
Does Tax Court's Retreat on Prepaid Interest Deduction Affect Taxpayers? 44 J. TAX 258
(1976). See also section 208 of the 1976 Act. In Bernard Resnik, 66 T.C. No. 10 (May 12,
1976), the court held that the material distortion of income test would first be applied at
the partnership level. It declined to state whether a deduction for prepaid interest that
passed muster at the partnership level might be examined for distortion at the partner
level.
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and insisted on HLI's contribution of $80,000 for interest payments. A
different result might be reached if one of several money partners in-
sists that his entire contribution be traced to the soft money items.
The facts in Lewis suggest the additional point that soft money al-
locations often include payments to partners. It is quite common, for
example, for the contributions of limited partners to be applied to
salaries or fees to general partners. The Code provides that payments
to a partner for services or for the use of capital may be treated as pay-
ments to an outsider to the extent they are "determined without regard
to the income of the partnership."'114 This so-called "guaranteed pay-
ment" provision has been abused because some have reported on the
assumption that payments that fall within its description are auto-
matically deductible. Recent authority highlights what should have
been clear all along: guaranteed payments can not be used to convert
capital expenditures into immediately deductible items. If the payment
must be capitalized if made to an outsider, it must be capitalized if
made to a partner. 115
1 The "without regard to income" requirement for guaranteed pay-
ment treatment merits a strong word of caution. Recall that, in Lewis,
Anchorage received a management fee of a percentage of the gross
rentals derived from the project. Until very recently it was generally
assumed that payments to a partner for services based on a percentage of
gross receipts satisfied the "without regard to income" requirement. It
also was assumed, on the other hand, that payments to a partner for
services based on a percentage of net receipts would violate the require-
ment. If the payment is deemed to be based on income, it will be
treated not as a guaranteed payment but as a distribution of partner-
ship income, which does not result in a deduction to the partnership.
The recent case of Edward T. Pratt"6 rejected rather summarily the
distinction between payments based on gross receipts and payments
based on net receipts. It held that payments to a partner for managing
a shopping center based on gross rent receipts did not qualify as guar-
anteed payments because they were "based on income." Pratt is cur-
114. CODE § 707(c) provides as follows:
(c) Guaranteed Payments.-To the extent determined without regard to the in-
come of the partnership, payments to a partner for services or the use of capital
shall be considered as made to one who is not a member of the partnership, but
only for the purposes of section 61(a) (relating to gross income) and section 162(a)
(relating to trade or business expenses).
115. Stated differently, a payment that otherwise qualifies under § 707(c) will not
result in a current deduction if it constitutes a capital expense. Jackson E. Cagle, Jr., 63
T.C. 86 (1974); Rev. Rul. 75-214, 1975-1 C.B. 185. See also note 205 infra.
116. 64 T.C. 203 (1975).
PARTNERSHIP ALLOCATIONS
rently on appeal to the Fifth Circuit and should be followed carefully
by planners making allocations through guaranteed payments.
C. Flexibility on Bailing Out
There are thousands of limited partners faced with interests in tax
shelters that have come to produce nightmares rather than miracles.
They have become painfully aware that their investments currently
require them to pay tax on more cash than they receive and that sales of
their interests would require them to pay tax on hypothetical distribu-
tions of cash that never actually take place.1 17 Indeed, they may have
been informed by attorneys or accountants, who hopefully were not
their investment advisors, that part or all of the tax on the hypothetical
distributions will be at ordinary income rates.118 They may also have
been informed that the result is the same if they simply abandon their
interests"19 or give them away to charities.120 No matter how graceless or
artful their withdrawals, exiting partners will be treated as having re-
ceived distributions of cash to the extent they are relieved of their shares
of partnership liabilities. Limited partners are automatically relieved of
those liabilities as they relinquish their profits interests,12' and have no
freedom to allocate the constructive distributions of cash to any or all
of their fellow partners.
Leon A. Harris2 2 merits consideration because it suggests at least
partial relief for some distraught investor-partners. Leon Harris had a
1% interest as a general partner and a 39% interest as a limited partner
in a partnership that owned a shopping center. 2 Harris wanted to bail
out of the partnership for several reasons. Most basically, the shopping
center had been a troubled property that required the partners to con-
117. CODE § 752(b) and (c); Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(d) (1960); Rev. Rul. 74-40, 1974-1
C.B. 159.
118. CODE § 751. Thus, for example, the disposition of a partnership interest may
trigger the recapture of accelerated depreciation. Treas. Reg. § 1.751-1(c)(4) (1971).
119. Rev. Rul. 74-40, 1974-1 C.B. 159, 160 Situation 3.
120. Rev. Rul. 75-194, 1975-1 C.B. 159, describes the income tax consequences of a
contribution of a limited partnership interest to a charity.
121. CODE § 752(b) and (c); Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1960).
122. 61 T.C. 770 (1974).
123. Permanent financing was partially provided by a $4 million loan from the Con-
necticut General Life Insurance Co.
The debt to Connecticut was evidenced by two notes, dated December 15, 1955, in
the amounts of $3,850,000 and $150,000, and was secured by a deed of trust of the
same date. The $3,850,000 and $150,000 notes had maturity dates of March 15, 1976,
and March 15, 1966, respectively. Commencing on April 15, 1956, the monthly install-
ment payment on the larger note was $24,370.50.
Id. at 772.
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tribute additional funds from time to time. 2 4 The situation was likely
to deteriorate because the main tenant was a department store whose
lease was to expire in six years, the approximate maturity of the perma-
nent financing. Furthermore, Harris was informed by his attorney that
depreciation deductions would soon be insufficient to shield from tax
the monthly amortization payments made on the permanent financing.
Harris tried unsuccessfully to solicit an offer to purchase satisfactory to
his partners, who were more optimistic about the center's prospects than
he. 125 The only other general partner, Charro Corporation, also had a
1% interest as a general partner and a 39% interest as a limited partner.
Charro was owned by one Kramer, a first cousin of Harris, and trusts
for Kramer's children. 126 Harris and Kramer arranged a two-step with-
drawal to produce ordinary loss deductions for Harris.
First, on December 28, 1967, the partnership "sold" an undivided
10% interest in the shopping center real estate, subject to the perma-
nent financing, to Kramer and his attorney as trustees for their chil-
dren.1 27 The trusts paid $6,000 in cash and agreed to pay 10% of the
debt service on the permanent financing or reconvey their interests to
the partnership. Concurrently, the trusts leased back their interests to
the partnership. The term of the leases-back coincided with the ma-
turity of the permanent financing and required rental payments equal
to 10% of debt service. Rent due the trusts from the partnership was to
be reduced when shopping center revenues were insufficient to cover
partnership expenses, and subsequent rents were to be increased to re-
store the reductions. The partnership reported a $62,321 loss from the
sale of a section 1231 asset. It had been agreed that the entire loss would
be allocated to Harris and that
the reduction of the partnership interest in the shopping center real
estate resulting from such transaction would be allocated solely to
him, that his interest in the partnership assets and the capital account
would be reduced by an amount equal to such computed loss and re-
duction, and that there would be a corresponding adjustment of his
distributable share of the partnership taxable income.' 2s
124. In 1964 the partners contributed an additional $30,000. Id. at 778 n.3.
125. The partnership agreement provided that general partners could not withdraw
without being liable to the limited partners and that limited partnership interests could
not be assigned without the written consent of the other partners. The only exception con-
cerned transfers to their controlled corporations and, in the case of the limited partners,
transfers to nonprofit charitable, religious, or educational organizations. Id. at 773.
126. The remaining two limited partners were also first cousins of Harris. Id.
127. The 10% interest, subject to the permanent mortgage financing, was conveyed 6%
to the trust for the Kramer children and 4% to the trusts for his attorney's children. Id.
at 774.
128. Id. at 775.
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Harris' fractional interest in the partnership was reduced accordingly
from 40% to 33 1/3%. 129
Harris' withdrawal was completed on November 1 of the following
year when he received in full satisfaction of his interest a conveyance of
an undivided 30% interest 13° in the shopping center real estate, subject
to the permanent financing.'13 As had the trusts after their "purchases,"
Harris concurrently leased his undivided interest back to the partner-
ship at a maximum monthly rental equal to the monthly payments due
on the permanent financing. The following month, Harris "sold" his
undivided 30% interest in the shopping center (subject to the lease-
back to the partnership) to his attorney, as trustee for the latter's chil-
dren, and to Kramer and his attorney, also as trustees, for a total cash
payment of $7,000. Harris claimed the transaction resulted in a $212,825
loss from the sale of a section 1231 asset.
The Service argued that the losses claimed by Harris for 1967 and
1968 were not the result of bona fide arm's-length transactions. 3 2 Its
position was essentially that
Harris was ready to give away his interest and his attorney endeavored
to so structure the transactions to show losses resulting from sales. The
purported sales were fictional and the computed loss was not realized
by the partnership or Harris. 133
All the participants were first cousins or their attorneys, and the cash
that changed hands was nominal compared to the tax advantages in-
volved. Harris received only $13,000 in cash but reaped ordinary loss
deductions in excess of a quarter of a million dollars. In return for their
$13,000, the trusts received three-quarters of a million dollars in basis
that presumably was allocated in substantial part to depreciable or
amortizable items. There was evidence that the interests were worth
more than the amounts paid by the trusts, which amounts were not in
proportion to the relative interests they received. In December of 1968,
Harris' attorney paid only $1,000 for a 20% interest in the shopping
center whereas Kramer paid $3,600 for a 6% interest. Nor did the trans-
actions appear to have any significant impact on the trusts during the
129. His interest as a limited partner was reduced from 39% to 32.33% and he re-
mained a 1% general partner. Id.
130. This 30% interest was one-third of the partnership's remaining 90% interest in
the real estate.
131. The opinion does not specify the term of the lease. Presumably, as with the
leases-back from the trusts, it was coextensive with the permanent financing.
132. The Service had argued, inter alia, that the transfers to the trusts were to be
treated as part gift, part sale.
133. Reply Brief for Respondent at 11.
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term of the leases-back. They would obtain no cash benefit during that
period because the rent payments they were to receive would not exceed
the debt service attributable to their interests. True, they had agreed to
pay their share of debt service even if the rent due from the partnership
were reduced, but their promise to pay appears to have been non-
recourse and secured only by their promise to reconvey.
Despite these indications of the economic insignificance or unreality
of central features of the transactions, the court found sufficient sub-
stance to uphold the characterization by the parties. It noted that Harris
had relinquished his entire interest in the partnership and its assets, had
received cash and other property worth in excess of $13,000, and had
been relieved prospectively of liability as a general partner. It found
that neither Harris nor his wife nor any of their children had any inter-
est in the trusts, that the beneficiaries were not the natural objects of
his bounty, that he had attempted to negotiate the best prices possible,
and that the sale prices were not so low as to show the lack of arm's-
length dealing.
The Service had argued alternatively that Harris' losses were capital
losses from the sale of a partnership interest rather than ordinary losses
from the sale of a section 1231 asset. Harris relinquished his entire
interest in the partnership, and the trusts acquired "more than a por-
tion of the physical asset"; they acquired "a portion of a going business
which they entered as joint" venturers. 3 4 The leases-back left the entire
property interest underlying Harris' partnership interest in the uninter-
rupted control of the partnership. Profit sharing was involved insofar as
the rents due the trusts increased or decreased with the annual income
of the partnership.
Despite these indications that the trusts had replaced Harris in the
partnership, the court held that there had been no "sale" of a partner-
ship interest because the trusts had not acquired the equivalent of
Harris' partnership interest. First, they did not receive a share in profits
because upward rental adjustments were to be made only until any
previous rental reductions had been restored. Total rental was fixed;
only the time for payment was flexible. Second, the transfers did not
cover the personal property of the partnership.1 35
134. Id. at 18.
135. The holding that the trusts did not become members of the shopping center
partnership is puzzling and might not have been reached had the case been litigated
differently. Compare, e.g., S. Rex Lewis, 65 T.C. 625 (1975), text accompanying notes
107-09 supra. Surely the fact that they did not acquire an interest in the miscellaneous
and not very substantial personalty of the partnership was not the deciding factor.
They could have acquired interests as partners even though their total interest did
not have the precise features of Harris' interest. The determining fact must have
been that the rental payments the trusts were to receive would not exceed the debt
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Finally, the Service had argued that the principal purpose limitation
had been violated by the 1967 allocation to Harris of the entire partner-
ship loss from the 10% sale to the trusts. The court upheld the alloca-
tion even though "the desire of [Harris] to obtain an ordinary instead of
a capital loss was a motivating factor in the structuring of all the trans-
actions." 13 6 The court found an overriding economic purpose in Harris'
desire to terminate his involvement in a partnership whose other mem-
bers were much more optimistic than he. It also found an "exact equiv-
alence between the amount of the loss and the economic effect as among
the partners": 137
Furthermore, of critical significance is the obvious "economic ef-
fect" of the allocation agreement. Petitioner received the cash pro-
ceeds of the sale; the loss allocated to him was applied to reduce his
capital account, and his share of the related items of future profits,
losses, and proceeds in case of liquidation was reduced proportion-
ately.138
The court emphasized that the losses allocated to Harris did not exceed
the amount he would have received if the partnership had sold the
shopping center or if it had been distributed pro rata to all partners and
they had sold it.
It should be emphasized that the court did not approve the alloca-
tion of losses simply because it had been reflected by a charge against
Harris' capital account. The capital accounts of the partners receiving
special allocations were charged in both Orrisch and Harris. Although
all the depreciation was charged against the Orrisches' capital account,
it was never intended that capital accounts would affect the division of
economic benefit or loss. Stated differently, the special allocation of de-
preciation was not accompanied by any change in the sharing of the
economic consequences of the partnership. In this respect, Harris is at
the other extreme. Harris received all the tax and cash benefits of the
1967 sale, and the charge against his capital account reflected a direct
reduction of his economic interest in the partnership. There was a pro
service payments the trusts were to make on the permanent financing. Yet the im-
portance of this fact seems less significant in light of surrounding facts. First, it did
not appear that the partnership was generating any cash above that necessary to cover
costs and debt service. Therefore, it does not seem significant that the trusts had no share
in something that did not exist. Second, the lease terms were coextensive with the remain-
ing financing and would expire in approximately six years. Presumably the trusts at that
time would be entitled to full pro rata shares in profits, as well as the coercive right to
partition. Perhaps the court felt it was at that point that the trusts would become part-
ners for tax purposes.
136. 61 T.C. at 786.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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rata reduction of his interest in operating profits and losses and of his
interest in proceeds of any refinancing or sale. In short, the allocation of
the depreciation deductions in Orrisch affected none of the economic
arrangements of the partners whereas the allocation of the loss in Harris
affected all of the economic arrangements of the partners.
Harris suggests that partners have flexibility to allocate that comple-
ments their flexibility to characterize in a bail-out situation. Partners
are free to characterize the withdrawal of a member as either a sale or
a liquidation of a partnership interest, even though the two may be in-
distinguishable apart from tax purposes. 1 9 Thus, a withdrawal may be
treated as a sale of a partnership interest even if it results in the termi-
nation of the partnership for tax purposes. 4 0 Form is respected over
substance in this area because Congress intended partners to have "flex-
ibility" to determine their tax burdens among themselves.
[T]his policy of "flexibility" is particularly pertinent in determining
the tax consequences of the withdrawal of a partner. Where the prac-
tical differences between a "sale" and a "liquidation" are, at most,
slight, if they exist at all, and where the tax consequences to the part-
ners can vary greatly, it is in accord with the purpose of the statutory
provisions to allow the partners themselves, through arm's-length
negotiations, to determine whether to take the "sale" route or the
"liquidation" route, thereby allocating the tax burden among them-
selves.141
If the withdrawal is characterized as a sale, the withdrawing partner will
139. David A. Foxman, 41 T.C. 535, 549-50 (1964), afl'd, 352 F.2d 466 (3d Cir. 1965):
At first blush, one may indeed wonder why Congress provided for such drastically
different tax consequences, depending upon whether the amounts received by the
withdrawing partner are to be classified as the proceeds of a "sale" or as "payments
* 0 * in liquidation" of his interest. For, there may be very little, if any, difference
in ultimate economic effect between a "sale" of a partnership interest to the remain-
ing partners and a "liquidation" of that interest. In the case of a sale the remaining
partners may well obtain part or all of the needed cash to pay the purchase price
from the partnership assets, funds borrowed by the partnership or future earnings
of the partnership. [Footnotes omitted.]
140. Treas. Reg. § 1.741-1(b) (1960):
(b) Section 741 shall apply whether the partnership interest is sold to one or
more members of the partnership or to one or more persons who are not members
of the partnership. Section 741 shall also apply even though the sale of the partner-
ship interest results in a termination of the partnership under section 708(b). Thus,
the provisions of section 741 shall be applicable (1) to the transferor partner in a
2-man partnership when he sells his interest to the other partner, and (2) to all the
members of a partnership when they sell their interests to one or more persons out-
side the partnership.
141. 41 T.C. at 551-52 (footnotes omitted). Thus, the typical case involving whether
the withdrawal of a partner was by a sale or by payments in liquidation is a contest not
between the Service and one or more partners, but among the partners themselves fighting
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realize capital gain or loss 142 and the purchasing partners will increase
their bases in their enlarged partnership interests. If the withdrawal is
characterized as a liquidation 143 of the withdrawing member's entire
interest, payments to the withdrawing partner will be treated as guar-
anteed payments if they are not dependent upon partnership income.'4
That is, they will be included in the ordinary income of the withdraw-
ing partner and will generate a deduction at the partnership level.145 If
the flexibility to allocate in a bail-out situation is as great as the flex-
ibility to characterize, there could presumably be not just special alloca-
tions between the withdrawing partner and the remaining partners as a
class, as in Harris, but special allocations among the partners who re-
main. Thus, for example, the deduction from the guaranteed payment
to a withdrawing partner might be specially allocated to one of the
remaining partners.
D. "Bottom-Line" Allocations
A partnership's taxable income or loss is known as its "bottom line."
In short, it is the total of all items of partnership income and deduction
other than those that have been specially allocated.' 6 A bottom-line
allocation is the ratio by which partners share in the overall taxable
income or loss of the partnership. In many partnerships, the bottom-line
over who should bear what adverse tax consequences of the withdrawal.
142. CODE § 741.
143. CODE § 761(d):
(d) Liquidation of a partner's interest.-For purposes of this subchapter, the term
"liquidation of a partner's interest" means the termination of a partner's entire
interest in a partnership by means of a distribution, or a series of distributions, to
the partner by the partnership.
See also Treas. Reg. § 1.761-1(d) (1972):
A series of distributions will come within the meaning of this term whether they are
made in one year or in more than one year. Where a partner's interest is to be
liquidated by a series of distributions, the interest will not be considered as liqui-
dated until the final distribution has been made. For the basis of property distrib-
uted in one liquidating distribution, or in a series of distributions in liquidation,
see section 732(b). A distribution which is not in liquidation of a partner's entire
interest, as defined in this paragraph, is a current distribution. Current distribu-
tions, therefore, include distributions in partial liquidation of a partner's interest,
and distributions of the partner's distributive share. See paragraph (a)(1)(ii)
of § 1.731-1.
144. CODE § 736(a)(2). If the payment in liquidation is made with regard to the in-
come of the partnership, it will be considered a distributive share of partnership income.
CODE § 736(a)(1). To the extent the payment in liquidation is made in exchange for the
withdrawing partner's interest in partnership property other than unrealized receivables
and good will, it will be considered as a distribution by the partnership rather than as a
guaranteed payment or distributive share of partnership income. CODE § 736(b)(1); Treas.
Reg. § 1.736-1(b)(1) (1965).
145. CODE § 707(c).
146. CODE § 702(a)(9).
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allocation determines not just the overall taxable income or loss of the
partnership but also all of the economic consequences of partnership
operations. Each partner has one overall sharing ratio that determines
his allocation of cash flow, capital gains or losses, taxable income or loss,
etc. At the other extreme from this all-controlling bottom-line alloca-
tion is what can be referred to as a "pure" bottom-line allocation: one
that apportions the partnership's taxable income or loss without also
allocating the economic consequences of partnership operations. Pure
bottom-line allocations arise when additional ratios are used to allocate
the cash consequences of partnership operations.
Pure bottom-line allocations have been particularly common in real
estate tax shelters because they enable cash benefits to be allocated quite
differently than tax losses. It is fairly common for the partnership agree-
ment to provide different ratios for sharing net cash flow, proceeds in
the event of any refinancing or sale of partnership property, and part-
nership taxable income or loss. The allocation of taxable income or loss
under such an arrangement is a pure bottom-line allocation that con-
trols only tax consequences because different allocation ratios are used
to allocate the various cash benefits.
The following hypothetical summarizes the provisions in a partner-
ship agreement that would effect such an arrangement. A limited part-
nership is formed with general partner G and limited partners A and B.
The partnership agreement provides that net cash flow will be allocated
50% to G and 25% each to A and B; that the proceeds of any refinanc-
ing or sale of the partnership assets will be allocated 60% to G and 20%
each to A and B; and that the partnership's taxable income or loss shall
be allocated among the partners in proportion to their initial contribu-
tions to capital. G makes no initial contribution to capital and A and B
each make an initial contribution to capital of $5,000. An apartment
house is acquired for $100,000, paid for with the initial contributions
to capital and the proceeds of a $90,000 nonrecourse loan. The three
different allocation ratios, all or none of which might be brought into
play in a particular year, depending on the results of partnership opera-
tions, may be summarized as follows:
Proceeds of
Refinancing Taxable Income
Net Cash Flow or Sale or Loss
G 50% 60% 0%
A 25 20 50
B 25 20 50
PARTNERSHIP ALLOCATIONS
The attractiveness of this type of arrangement to a promoter who
wants to retain a substantial interest in cash benefits and pass the bulk
of tax benefits to his high-bracket investor-partners is clear. Although
the bottom-line allocation is stated in terms of income or loss in the
alternative, the typical tax shelter partnership will produce only tax
losses, not taxable income, at least in the early years. Indeed, if sub-
stantial amounts of taxable income are ever expected, the partnership
agreement may provide that the bottom-line allocation change, or
"flip-flop," before that occurs. The change may be couched in terms of
the completion of the type of "pay-back" period discussed above. In
short, by allocating tax losses according to initial contribution to cap-
ital, and by disclaiming any initial contribution to capital on his own
part, G has established a fixed ratio that passes to the limited partners
the benefit of all depreciation and other deductions beyond those neces-
sary to shelter from tax the net cash flow and debt amortization of the
partnership. That is, the limited partners receive all surplus deductions.
The basic arrangement described above is usually modified in two
ways.147 First, the general partner is usually given at least some portion
of the partnership's bottom line. This has been particularly true since
Revenue Procedure 74-17,14 in which the Service refused to rule on tax
classification unless the combined interest of all the general partners in
each item of partnership income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit is at
least 1% throughout the life of the partnership. Thus in the hypo-
thetical transaction just described, G would credit himself with at least
a small initial contribution to capital so he would receive some portion
of the partnership's taxable income or loss. Second, the general partner
typically receives a substantial portion of annual cash benefits in addi-
tion to his allocable share of the partnership's net cash flow. These
additional cash benefits take the form of guaranteed payments, which
147. Net cash flow, proceeds of refinancing or sale and taxable income or loss are the
three basic dimensions of partnership operations and discussion is cast in those terms for
the sake of clarity of presentation. In practice, the partnership agreement may contain
much more elaborate allocation provisions than the basic model under discussion. First, the
classes of items subject to separate allocations may be more numerous. There may be, for
example, separate allocations of: ordinary income; ordinary loss; capital gains; capital loss;
net cash flow; proceeds of refinancing; and proceeds of sale. Indeed, if the partnership
holds more than one property, there may be different sharing ratios for each property.
Second, the allocation ratios may apply only to particular slices of each category. Thus,
for example, partners A and B may share the first ten thousand dollars of annual cash
flow on a 50-50 basis, the second ten thousand on a 60-40 basis, etc. Third, the allocation
ratios, within each slice of each category, may change over time. Thus, for example, A
may be entitled to 50% of the first ten thousand dollars of annual cash flow only until
he has recovered the amount by which his capital contribution exceeded that of B.
148. 1974-1 C.B. 438.
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are deducted by the partnership in the computation of net cash flow
available for distribution. 1'4 9
There are three tax reasons why general partners are frequently al-
located substantial cash benefits in the form of guaranteed payments
rather than through larger distributive shares of net cash flow. The first
is to increase the amount of partnership tax losses generated for distri-
bution to the investor-partners through the bottom-line allocation.150 If
guaranteed payment treatment is appropriate, the partnership will re-
ceive a deduction it otherwise would not have, and the general partner
will have to include the amount of the payment in income. If he has
surplus losses from other sources, the deduction is generated at no
additional cost to anyone other than the Treasury.
Second, the general partner may be allocated a substantial portion of
his cash benefits in the form of guaranteed payments in order to in-
crease the amount of losses that may be deducted by the limited part-
ners. Limited partners may not deduct losses in excess of their bases in
their partnership interests.'5' Each limited partner has a basis in his
partnership interest that includes his cash contribution plus his share of
partnership liabilities.152 Limited partners share in partnership liabil-
ities for basis purposes only if those liabilities are fully nonrecourse.
15 3
There is no discretion to allocate liabilities for basis purposes: limited
partners automatically share in nonrecourse liabilities in the same pro-
portion as they share in partnership profits.15 4 Assume that the partners'
interest in net cash flow is their interest in profits155 If the limited part-
149. See text accompanying notes 114-16 supra.
150. CODE § 707(c); Treas. Reg. § 1.707-1(c) (1960).
151. CODE § 704(d); Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(d)(1) (1964):
A partner's share of loss in excess of his adjusted basis at the end of the partnership
taxable year will not be allowed for that year. However, any loss so disallowed shall
be allowed as a deduction at the end of the first succeeding partnership taxable
year, and subsequent partnership taxable years, to the extent that the partner's ad-
justed basis for his partnership interest at the end of any such year exceeds zero ....
152. CODE §§ 722 and 752(a).
153. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1960).
154. Id.
155. There is no generally agreed-upon definition of the term "profits." Many discuss
the term as the partners' overall ratio for sharing "profits or losses," that is, as the partner-
ship's bottom line. See, e.g., Pennell, Tax Considerations in Organizing a Partnership, 25TH
U.S.C. TAX INST. 333, 376 (1973). What is the interest in profits in the case of a pure
bottom-line allocation? It is submitted that the answer to this question is the same as
the answer to the question, what is the Code's reallocation mechanism. That is, the
profits interest is the measure by which the partners share in the economic benefits of
partnership operations. This could be their ratio for sharing net cash flow, the proceeds
of refinancing, or the proceeds of sale. It could be viewed as a combination of all
three that should also take into account the extent to which cash distributions are made
in the form of guaranteed payments. The 1976 Act legislative history makes clear
that the profits interest in a particular partnership is not necessarily either the partner-
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ners were to receive a relatively small interest in net cash flow they
would automatically receive only a small amount of partnership liabil-
ities for basis purposes. To avoid this result, cash is siphoned off to the
promoter in the form of guaranteed payments to enable the limited
partners to claim a larger proportionate interest in net cash flow, that
is, in profits. They therefore claim a larger share of partnership liabil-
ities to increase their bases and, hence, the amount of tax losses they can
deduct.
A final reason to allocate cash benefits to the general partner in the
form of guaranteed payments is to give the partnership's bottom-line
allocation economic substance. As we have just seen, if the general
partner is allocated a substantial portion of his expected cash benefits
in the form of guaranteed payments, the limited partners can be al-
located a larger proportion of the partnership's net cash flow. In short,
the allocation of net cash flow can be made to coincide with the alloca-
tion of the partnership's taxable income or loss. If the ratio that allo-
cates taxable income or loss also allocates net cash flow, a pure bottom-
line allocation has been avoided.
Pure bottom-line allocations should be avoided whenever possible.
Contrast their use to pass surplus deductions to high-bracket investors
with Example 3 of the principal purpose Regulations:
[U]nder an agreement with respect to partnership CD, it is provided
that C's distributive share of income shall be the first $10,000 of tax-
exempt income and D's distributive share of income shall be the first
$10,000 of dividend income, the balances to be divided equally. Since
the principal purpose of this provision is to allocate tax-exempt inter-
est to C, who is in a higher income tax bracket than D, it will be dis-
regarded.15 6
ship's bottom line or the interest in net cash flow. The Senate Report explains the
new reallocation mechanism, in part, as follows:
In determining a "partner's interest in the partnership", all the facts and cir-
cumstances are to be taken into account. Among the relevant factors . . . are the
interests of respective partners in profits and losses (if different from that of taxable
income or loss), cash flow; and their rights to distributions of capital upon liquida-
tion.
S. REP. No. 94-938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 100 (1976). See also text accompanying notes
222-23 infra.
156. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2), Example 3 (1964). The result would be different if
the partners bore all potential gain and risk of economic unprofitability of the under-
lying securities:
Example (3). Rather than impair the credit standing of the AB partnership by a
distribution, the partners agree to invest surplus partnership funds in an equal dollar
amount of municipal bonds and corporate stock. The partners further agree that A
is to receive all the interest income and gain or loss from tax-exempt bonds and B
is to receive all the dividend income and gain or loss from corporate stock. Such
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Example 3 is extremely significant because it strikes down an allocation
that initially appears to have substantial economic effect. C and D pre-
sumably bear the economic risk that their respective types of income
will not be realized, or will be realized only after great delay. However,
an allocation will not necessarily have "substantial economic effect"
simply because it is made to correlate with some economic reality. As
stated by the court in Orrisch, the "substantial economic effect" test is
violated if the allocation in question does "not reflect normal business
considerations but [is] designed primarily to minimize the overall tax
liabilities of the partners.."157
The pure bottom-line allocation in the basic hypothetical under dis-
cussion reflects the common practice of grounding allocations of taxable
income or loss on initial contributions to capital. Does a pure bottom-
line allocation satisfy the principal purpose limitation because it is
correlated with initial contribution to capital? At first blush, it seems
reasonable to allocate the partnership's taxable income or loss in ac-
cordance with the capital contributions of its members, and such an
arrangement appears to have substantial economic effect. On the other
hand, we have seen that it is a simple matter for a general partner to
eschew an initial credit for his contribution of services or property. He
may receive substantial sums in salary, fees, or other distributions, even
though he is credited with no initial contribution. We have also seen
that Orrisch supports the inference that initial contributions to capital
cannot be rewarded with depreciation deductions unless they are sim-
ilarly rewarded from the economic benefits of partnership operations.
Bottom-line allocations are essentially distributions of all surplus de-
preciation deductions that remain after cash flow and debt amortization
have been sheltered from tax. Therefore, one might expect the Orrisch
principle to apply to bottom-line allocations as well as to naked alloca-
tions of depreciation deductions.155 For these reasons, it is prudent to
avoid a pure bottom-line allocation, even one that is based on initial
contributions to capital. "Business validity" should be given to the ratio
that allocates partnership taxable income or loss by making it control
also the allocation of some economic component of partnership dis-
tributions.
allocation has substantial economic effect and will be recognized in the absence of
other circumstances showing that the principal purpose was tax avoidance or evasion.
Id. Note that even in this situation the Regulations hold open the possibility that the
allocation might be disregarded if the prohibited principal purpose were shown by "other
circumstances." One is left to wonder what those other circumstances might be.
157. 55 T.C. at 401.
158. But see F.C. McDougal, 62 T.C. 720 (1974), text accompanying notes 64-65
supra.
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There are those who have argued that bottom-line allocations are
not subject to the principal purpose limitation. The argument is based
on the fact that the principal purpose limitation, by its terms, applies
only to allocations of "any item." The theory is that "taxable income or
loss" is a composite that is not an "item" within the meaning of this
provision. Proponents stress dictum in Jean V. Kresser 59 that indicates
sympathy with the position that allocations of taxable income or loss
are not subject to the principal purpose limitation. Kresser involved
two real estate partnerships that were controlled by one William H.
Appleton and operated under oral agreements. Appleton had a large
net operating loss carryover that was to expire if not used by the end of
1965. At a meeting of less than all the partners it was resolved to allo-
cate all 1965 income to Appleton. It was stated that 1965 income allo-
cated to Appleton would be restored to the other partners in subsequent
years by reducing his share of distributable income, or, in years of no
net income, by charging him with net losses. Notwithstanding these
pronouncements, actual cash distributions and withdrawals during 1965
were in less than half the amount of 1965 taxable income and were
made in accordance with the partners' overall sharing ratios. Indeed,
Appleton received cash distributions in 1965 that were less than 10%
of 1965 taxable income. What distributions were made were reported
as returns of capital or distributions of income that had been taxed in
prior years.
The court acknowledged that the principal purpose limitation
would have been violated if it were applicable. However, it specifically
declined to decide whether the principal purpose limitation applies "to
the composite of all of the partnership's income."160 Instead, it relied
on two other grounds to disregard the allocation. First, it said there was
no proof that the partnership agreement had been amended in a man-
ner sufficient to effect the allocation. Section 761(c) provides that a
159. 54 T.C. 1621 (1970).
160. 54 T.C. at 1631 n.5:
While we are fully prepared to accept the contention that the principal purpose of
the alleged modifications was the "avoidance or evasion" of tax on Appleton within
the meaning of sec. 704(b)(2), we are faced with the petitioners' troublesome argu-
ment that sec. 704(b)(2) applies only to "items" of income, etc., dealt with in pars.
(1) through (8) of sec. 702(a) and does not govern par. (9) relating to the composite
of all of the partnership's income (sometimes referred to as its "ordinary income")
which is here involved. The point is not without difficulty. Although there is general
language in Smith v. Commissioner, 331 F. 2d 298, 301 (C.A. 7), in accord with the
Government's argument, the structure of the statute itself and language in the legis-
lative history would seem to give support to petitioners' position. See S. Rept. No.
1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 379. However, in view of our conclusion that there was
not in fact a bona fide reallocation of income among the partners, we do not reach
the question whether sec. 704(b)(2) is applicable to sec. 702(a)(9).
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partnership agreement may be amended until the time required for
filing the partnership return by consent of all the partners or by any
other manner provided in the partnership agreement.16' The court was
not persuaded that all partners had agreed to the allocation nor did it
find that partnership allocations could be changed without the consent
of all the partners.
Second, the court found that the alleged reallocation of income to
Appleton was a "paper transaction having no consequences of sub-
stance" that "did not in reality shift the 1965 income from the other
partners to him.' ' 16 2 The likelihood that Appleton "personally guar-
anteed that the amounts allocated to him would be restored to the other
partners regardless of the success or failure of the enterprises"'' 3 indi-
cated that the transaction was in the nature of a loan. On the other
hand, said the court, the fact that Appleton's withdrawals were far less
than the amount of income allocated to him suggested that not even so
much as a loan had occurred.
In short, Kresser is not very strong authority for the proposition that
bottom-line allocations are free from the principal purpose limitation.
It certainly does not even suggest that pure bottom-line allocations are
exempt. The allocation allegedly involved in Kresser was the opposite
of a pure bottom-line allocation: it was an all-controlling bottom-line
allocation. Finally, whatever comfort might be drawn from the dictum
that the principal purpose limitation may not apply is taken away by
the court's decision to disregard an allocation of taxable income or loss
on economic reality grounds.
Bottom-line allocations have been less obviously vulnerable than
naked allocations of depreciation because of the wording of the Code's
reallocation mechanism. Recall that Code section 704(b) provides that
if an allocation does not pass muster under the principal purpose lim-
itation it will be disregarded and reallocated according to the partners'
ratio for sharing "taxable income or loss of the partnership, as described
in section 702(a)(9)." Two questions immediately present themselves.
First, is the reallocation mechanism the partnership's bottom line? If
the answer is yes, it would be pointless to apply the principal purpose
limitation to a bottom-line allocation. If the answer is no, the question
161. CODE § 761(c):
(c) Partnership Agreement.-For purposes of this subchapter, a partnership agree-
ment includes any modifications of the partnership agreement made prior to, or at,
the time prescribed by law for the filing of the partnership return for the taxable
year (not including extensions) which are agreed to by all the partners, or which are
adopted in such other manner as may be provided by the partnership agreement.
162. 54 T.C. at 1631-32.
163. Id. at 1631.
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becomes how to reallocate a bottom-line allocation that violates the
principal purpose limitation.
The answer to both questions lies in the fact that the reallocation
mechanism, the norm of "taxable income or loss, as described in section
702(a)(9)," was intended to be the partners' ratio for sharing the overall
economic profits and losses of the enterprise. Thus, the Regulations
consider the effect of an allocation on "income or loss independently
of tax consequences.' 1 64 More precisely on point, they provide that in
the application of the reallocation mechanism
the manner in which the net profit or loss (computed after excluding
any item subject to a recognized special allocation) is actually credited
on the partnership books to the accounts of the partners will generally
determine each partner's share of taxable income or loss as described
in section 702(a)(9).165
In short, the Regulations, 166 the Tax Court 67 and the commentators 68
have consistently described the reallocation mechanism as the partners'
overall ratio for sharing "profits or losses." Therefore, if an allocation
of taxable income or loss is disregarded because it controls tax losses and
nothing more and is for the principal purpose of tax avoidance or
evasion, the losses should be reallocated according to the partners' shares
in the economic consequences of the enterprise. This could be reflected
in their share of net cash flow, determined by taking into consideration
guaranteed payments to promoters; their share of proceeds of refinanc-
ing; their share of proceeds of sale; or a combination thereof, depend-
ing on the nature of the partnership, its assets and their financing.
E. Retroactive Allocations
The term "retroactive allocations" has been used in a broad sense
to refer to ratios established to allocate items of income or loss previ-
ously accrued. A retroactive allocation in this broad sense is present if,
for example, partners wait until the end of the year to decide how to
divide the results of the year's operations. The term is more commonly
used in a much narrower sense to identify allocations to partners of gain
or loss incurred prior to their admission. The retroactivity that is at
issue is not that of the partnership allocation provision itself. The issue
164. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2) (1964) (emphasis added).
165. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(1) (1964) (emphasis added).
166. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(1) and (2) (1964).
167. Stanley C. Orrisch, 55 T.C. 395, 399-400 (1970).
168. See, e.g., Jackson et al., The Internal Revenue Code of 1954: Partnerships, 54
COLUM. L. REV. 1183, 1187 (1954).
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is whether a new partner may share in tax consequences incurred prior
to his admission. Thus, the retroactivity issue is present even if there is
no amendment to the partnership agreement. For example, some part-
nership agreements allocate taxable income or loss in accordance with
the partners' capital accounts at the close of the year. Although the al-
location provision itself remains unchanged, its effect is to allocate
preadmission gain or loss to partners admitted late in the year. The
issue has become controversial because tax shelter partnerships fre-
quently admit limited partners at the end of the year and allocate them
losses as if they had been members for the entire year.169 The permissi-
bility of retroactive allocations in this narrower sense has been unclear
and doubtful.
(1) The Arguments Against Retroactive Allocations.-The basic
argument against retroactive allocations of preadmission losses has been
that the Code requires proration when a partner is admitted during the
year. The provisions that require proration differ depending on the
manner in which the new partner acquires his interest. If he purchases
the entire interest of an existing partner, the proration mechanism is
the partnership's taxable year, which closes with respect to a partner
who sells his entire interest. 7 0 The selling partner must claim his dis-
tributive share of all items of partnership income, gain, loss, deduction,
or credit up until the point he transfers his partnership interest.17 1
Strict observance of this approach would require an interim closing of
the partnership books. To avoid this result, the Regulations provide a
less onerous procedure for determining the selling partner's allocable
share:
In order to avoid an interim closing of the partnership books, such
partner's distributive share of items described in section 702(a) may,
by agreement among the partners, be estimated by taking his pro rata
part of the amount of such items he would have included in his tax-
able income had he remained a partner until the end of the partner-
ship taxable year. The proration may be based on the portion of the
taxable year that has elapsed prior to the sale, exchange, or liquida-
169. In an highly leveraged partnership, the amount of losses allocated to the year-end
admittee may exceed the dollar amount of his investment. In order to obtain an advance
ruling on partnership classification, it must now be shown that the
aggregate deductions to be claimed by the partners as their distributive shares of
partnership losses for the first two years of operation of the limited partnership will
not exceed the amount of equity capital invested in the limited partnership.
Rev. Proc. 74-17, 1974-1 C.B. 438, 439.
170. CODE § 706(c)(2)(A)(i).
171. Treas. Reg. § 1.706-1(c)(2)(ii) (1973). He must also include any guaranteed
payments made to him up until that point. Id.
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tion, or may be determined under any other method that is reason-
able.172
The transferee must, according to the same proration computation
used by the transferor, report the balance. 1 73
If the year-end admittee purchases only a portion of the interest of
an existing partner, proration is also required, but the mechanism is
not the closing of the partnership's taxable year. Section 706(c)(2)(B)
provides:
The taxable year of a partnership shall not close.., with respect
to a partner who sells or exchanges less than his entire interest in the
partnership or with respect to a partner whose interest is reduced, but
such partner's distributive share of items described in section 702(a)
shall be determined by taking into account his varying interests in
the partnership during the taxable year.1 74
This provision is known as the "varying interests rule." The Regula-
tions thereunder do not specify how to compute the proration it re-
quires, and it would appear that the same options are available as if the
proration mechanism were the partnership's taxable year.
Many year-end admittees, however, do not purchase part or all of
the interest of an existing partner. Instead, they acquire their interests
directly from the partnership. One reason for this approach is to avoid
the automatic termination of the partnership for tax purposes that
would result if there were a sale or exchange of 50% or more of the
total interest in partnership capital and profits within a twelve-month
period. 7 5 The Regulations state that a contribution of property is not
a sale or exchange for purposes of the termination rule, 76 and a recent
ruling holds that the admission of new partners for cash contributions
does not result in termination, even if the new partners receive more
than 50% of the total interest in partnership capital and profits.1 77
The Regulations caution that an "exchange" of a partnership interest
may be found if a contribution to a partnership is preceded or followed
"within a short period" by a distribution.17 8 An argument can be made
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. CODE § 706(c)(2)(B).
175. CODE § 708(b)(1)(B). If there were such a termination, not only would the retro-
active allocation be impossible because the year-end admittees would be members of a
"new" partnership rather than the one that incurred the losses, but also accelerated de-
preciation methods available only to first users would be unavailable.
176. Treas. Reg. § 1.708-1(b)(1)(ii) (1960).
177. Rev. Rul. 75-428, 1975-2 C.B. 260. o
178. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.708-1(b)(l)(ii) (1960) and 1.731-1(c)(3) (1960).
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that there is a "turnaround distribution" to existing partners when new
admittees are automatically allocated shares in partnership liabilities.1 79
There is, however, no authority that a constructive distribution caused
by a shift in partnership liabilities is sufficient to classify the admission
of a new partner as an exchange of a partnership interest for termina-
tion purposes. 80
The basic argument that proration is required when the year-end
admittee acquires his interest directly from the partnership is based on
the varying interests rule. It applies not just to a partner who "sells or
exchanges" a portion of his interest, but also to a partner whose interest
is "reduced." The total interest of the existing partners is reduced as
new members are allocated shares in profits, losses, liabilities for basis
purposes, etc. Therefore, the varying interests rule clearly supports a
proration requirement in the case of a partner who acquires his interest
directly from the partnership. The general policy against "trafficking"
in tax losses supports an argument that any ambiguity should be re-
solved in favor of the proration requirement.
(2) The Arguments in Support of Retroactive Allocations.-There
are various arguments in support of retroactive allocations of preadmis-
sion losses. The basic position is that the proration requirement of the
varying interests rule is overridden by other provisions of subchapter K.
Specifically, section 704(a) permits allocations to be determined by
partnership agreement, and section 761(c) states that the partnership
agreement includes changes made until the time required for filing the
partnership return. Thus, the agreement can allocate to new members
as if they had been partners for the entire year. Under this approach,
the only limitation on allocations of preadmission losses is not the vary-
ing interests rule, but the principal purpose limitation. This, it is
argued, is satisfied because the admission of the year-end partner has the
substantial economic effect of placing his capital contribution at risk on
account of partnership losses and partnership liabilities incurred prior
179. A new member of a general partnership automatically shares in partnership li-
abilities according to his proportionate share of partnership losses, and a new limited
partner automatically shares in partnership nonrecourse liabilities according to his pro-
portionate share of partnership profits. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1956). Any decrease in an
existing partner's share of partnership liabilities, whether caused by a transfer of those
liabilities to a new partner or otherwise, is treated as a distribution of cash to him by the
partnership. CODE § 752(b).
180. Compare Sol Diamond, 56 T.C. 530, 546 (1971), af'd 492 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1974):
Regardless of whether there may be some kind of equitable justification for giving
the parenthetical clause [in the section 721 nonrecognition Regulations] some limited
form of affirmative operative scope, as perhaps where there is a readjustment of part-
ners' shares to reflect services being performed by one of the partners, we cannot
believe that the regulations were ever intended to bring section 721 into play in a
situation like the one before us. [Emphasis added.]
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to his admission.'" s On the other hand, proponents may argue that not
even the principal purpose limitation applies if the preadmission losses
are allocated through a bottom-line allocation. The theory is the one
discussed above that the principal purpose limitation does not apply to
allocations of overall partnership taxable income or loss.' s
Two additional arguments apply if the varying interests rule is not
overridden by the broad authority of partners to allocate freely by an
agreement amended before the time for filing. The first is that the
words "or with respect to a partner whose interest is reduced" were
intended to apply to partial liquidations and not to the admission of
new partners.1 8 3 The second is that what must be "reduced" to bring
the varying interests rule into play is the value of the interests of the
existing partners, not merely their sharing ratios. Under this approach,
the interest of the existing partners is not "reduced" if the contributions
of the new partners are equal to the value of the interests they
acquire.1s4
(3) The Rodman Decision.-The most recent authority in the con-
troversy about preadmission loss allocations is the Second Circuit's de-
cision in Rodman v. Commissioner.18 5 Rodman involved a partnership
engaged primarily in trading publicly the stock of a Canadian com-
pany. There were originally four equal partners, Norman and Robert
Rodman, Sidney Newman and Walter Ornstein. On November 2, 1956,
Ornstein sold his entire interest to the others. Three days later, Martin
Rodman acquired one-ninth interests from Norman and Robert. From
181. The effect of this argument is to place a substantial premium on the partnership
form. The shareholders of a subchapter S corporation are required to prorate their losses
on a daily basis. CODE § 1374(c). Consider also that a purchaser of property from another
individual may not deduct part or all of his purchase price on the ground that it was
applied to meet expenses incurred by the seller. Rev. Rul. 75-304, 1975-2 C.B. 94.
182. See text accompanying notes 159-68 supra.
183. Nims, Partnership Retroactive Allocations, 1976-13 BNA TAX MAN. MEM. at 3:
It seems logical to surmise that the legislative draftsmen of Sec. 706(c)(2)(B) were
contemplating partial liquidations when they utilized the phrase "a partner whose
interest is reduced." This would provide symmetry with the concept of sale, ex-
change or liquidation of the entire interest under Sec. 706(c)(2)(A). It is self-evident
that liquidation or partial liquidation entails taking something out of the partner-
ship. [Footnote omitted.]
184. Contra, I A. WILLIS, PARTNERSHIP TAXATION 286 (2d ed. 1976):
It is hard to accept the theory that the reduction in interest refers to anything other
than a reduction in proportionate interest. To say that when the pie is increased
enough to offset the reduction in proportionate interest there is no reduction in
interest is an unconvincing exercise in subtle semantics. Further, adoption of the
"size of the pie theory" would require valuations of the partnership equity before
the contribution and of the contribution made by the end of the year admittee.
185. 76-2 U.S.T.C. 85,258 (2d Cir. Sept. 17, 1976), reversing and remanding Norman
Rodman, [1973] 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 1307.
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then on, Newman had a one-third interest, and Norman, Robert and
Martin Rodman each had a two-ninth's interest. The partnership
initially reported a loss for 1956 and allocated Martin a share of the loss
based on the partnership's entire taxable year. When, however, the
Service determined that there was gain rather than loss, Martin asserted
that he should not be taxed on income that accrued prior to his admis-
sion. The Service persuaded the Tax Court to hold Martin liable for
gains based on the entire year. On appeal, the Service reversed its posi-
tion on the retroactivity issue and conceded that Martin could not share
in income or losses incurred prior to his admission.
The Second Circuit gave three reasons in support of its conclusion
that Martin could not share in income or loss incurred prior to his ad-
mission.1 86 It said that the retroactive allocation to Martin violated both
the general prohibition against assignments of income and the principal
purpose limitation.
In essence, the present case is no more than an assignment by Robert
and Norman of a percentage of their interests in the income earned
by them as partners prior to Martin's having joined the partnership.
As such, not only does the retroactive allocation of income to a new
partner violate the Helvering v. Horst general assignment of income
prohibition, it necessarily follows ... that such an attempted assign-
ment in the partnership agreement also falls within 704(b)(2)'s
caveat that a term in a partnership agreement cannot be controlling
for tax purposes where its principal purpose is the evasion of taxes.
Consequently, where a new partner is involved in the sale or exchange
of a partnership interest, we must disagree with the tax court's con-
clusion that the intent of the parties ... is the controlling factor as to
whether or not income or losses which accrued prior to the partner's
joining may be reallocated to him retroactively. 87
Finally, it said that the varying interests rule applied when Robert and
Norman each transferred a portion of their interest to Martin.
186. The Second Circuit's reversal of the Tax Court's decision on the retroactivity
issue comes as no surprise. Commentators had noted that the issue was poorly litigated
before the Tax Court and that its decision should not be relied upon. McGuire, Retro-
active Allocations Among Partners: The Rodman Decision, 52 TAxEs 325 (1974); Weidner,
Yearend Sales of Losses in Real Estate Partnerships, 1974 U. ILL. L.F. 533, 545-46.
187. 76-2 U.S.T.C. at 85,267 (citations omitted). This portion of the opinion cited
"Treas. Reg. § 1.708-1(e)(l)(i)." There is no such regulation. The court presumably in-
tended to cite Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e)(1)(i) (1964):
The production of income by a partnership is attributable to the capital or
services, or both, contributed by the partners. The provisions of subchapter K ...
are to be read in the light of their relationship to section 61, which requires, inter
alia, that income be taxed to the person who earns it through his own labor and
skill and the utilization of his own capital.
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Consequently, because Robert and Norman are required to take into
account their varying interests during the partnership taxable year, it
is only logical that Martin must do the same. During the partnership
year prior to November 6, 1956, Martin had no interest in the part-
nership. The only logical conclusion to be drawn from the Code's
provisions dealing with the amounts of a partnership's income and
losses attributable to the parties involved in the sale or exchange of a
partnership interest is that Martin had a two-ninth's interest in only
those items that accrued after he entered the partnership. To allow
partners by modification of the partnership agreement to rearrange
their interests over periods of time when no interests in fact existed
would be to disregard the provisions of the Code designed specifically
to deal with the allocation of partnership income and losses when
partnership interests are transferred. 188
Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for an allocation to
Martin of a share of partnership income "based upon the limited time
that he in fact had an interest in the partnership.' ' 189
Some commentators will no doubt emphasize that Rodman involved
a partner who received partial transfers from less than all of the exist-
ing partners, and not a partner who acquired his interest directly from
the partnership. They may also stress that the court's articulation of all
three theories is couched in terms of "sale or exchange" and remind us
once again that the admission of new partners for cash contributions
does not constitute a sale or exchange. Finally, they may stress that the
court did not discuss whether the interest of existing partners is "re-
duced" when a new member is admitted upon contribution.
The critical significance of the case should not be obscured by hope-
ful speculation that a different result might have been reached if
Martin had acquired his interest directly from the partnership and the
interests of all existing partners had been reduced equally. The opinion
makes clear that the varying interests rule cannot be overriden by con-
trary provisions in the partnership agreement. The opinion also makes
clear that the principal purpose limitation and assignment of income
principles can be violated notwithstanding the fact that the admission
of a new general partner exposes him to personal liability for partner-
ship obligations. Finally, the most striking aspect of the opinion is the
court's suggestion that assignment-of-income principles might prevent
the partners from computing proration under the shortcut method pro-
vided in the Regulations. 9"
188. 76-2 U.S.T.C. at 85,267-68 (emphasis added).
189. Id. at 85,268 (footnote omitted).
190. See text accompanying notes 201-04 infra.
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IV. THE TAx REFORM ACT OF 1976
A. Retroactive Allocations
The 1976 Act amends the varying interests rule to clearly require
proration when a new member acquires his interest directly from the
partnership:
The taxable year of a partnership shall not close .. with respect
to a partner who sells or exchanges less than this entire interest in the
partnership or with respect to a partner whose interest is reduced
(whether by entry of a new partner, partial liquidation of a partner's
interest, gift, or otherwise), but such partner's distributive share of
items described in section 702(a) shall be determined by taking into
account his varying interests in the partnership during the taxable
year.' 91
The amendment applies to partnership taxable years that begin after
December 31, 1975.192 However, the legislative history leaves un-
answered the question whether this provision is a new rule or simply a
clarification of existing law.1 93
The draftsmen had little sympathy for the argument that new part-
ners should be allowed to share in deductions incurred prior to their
admission.19 4 They therefore included three supplemental amendments
to make clear that the varying interests rule cannot be avoided by pro-
191. 1976 Act § 213(c)(1), amending CODE § 706(c)(2)(B). Italicized portions indicate the
changes made by the 1976 Act.
192. 1976 Act § 213(f)(1).
193. Both the House and Senate Reports contain the following statement:
The provisions are effective for taxable years of partnerships that begin after
December 31, 1975. The committee does not intend that any inference be drawn as
to the propriety or impropriety of a retroactive allocation under present law.
H.R. REP. No. 94-658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 125 (1975); S. REP. No. 94-938, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 98 (1976).
194. S. REP. No. 94-938 at 97:
In essence, the consequence of allowing retroactive allocations is that new part-
ners investing in the partnership towards the close of the taxable year are allowed
to deduct expenses which were incurred prior to their entry into the partnership.
Some argue that these retroactive allocations are proper because the funds invested
by the new partners serve to reimburse the original partners for their expenditures
and that, as an economic matter, the new partners have incurred the costs for which
they are claiming deductions. However, this argument loses its persuasiveness when
the new partner in a partnership situation is compared to that of an investor who
directly purchases property which had previously generated tax losses during the
taxable year. It is clear that in the latter case the investor would not be entitled to
deduct the losses incurred prior to his ownership of the property, notwithstanding
the fact that he may, in effect, be reimbursing the seller of property for losses al-
ready incurred.
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visions in the partnership agreement. Unfortunately, this intent is more
clearly expressed in the legislative history than in the three amend-
ments themselves. Section 704(a) is amended somewhat vaguely to reflect
that section 704 is not the exclusive limitation on the partners' author-
ity to determine partnership allocations by agreement:
A partner's distributive share of income, gain, loss, deduction, or
credit shall, except as otherwise provided in this chapter, be deter-
mined by the partnership agreement. 19 5
Somewhat more specifically, a new subsection 704(f) directs the reader
to the varying interests rule.'96 Finally, section 761, which permits
partners to amend their agreement until the time for filing their part-
nership return, is graced with a similar reference to the varying inter-
ests rule and a reference to section 704(b).197
The legislative history indicates that proration is required both as to
particular items of deduction and as to overall partnership income or
loss.
The conference agreement provides that income or losses will be
allocable to a partner only for the portion of the year that he is a
member of a partnership and not retroactively to periods prior to
entry.198
The history precludes any argument that the year-end admittee can
share in depreciation deductions or the resulting losses on the basis of
the entire year if the partnership does not charge depreciation on its
books until the end of the taxable year. On the other hand, the legisla-
tive history does indicate that partners are to be given substantial lee-
way to compute the required proration:
In determining the income, loss or special item allocable to an incom-
ing partner, the partnership will either allocate on a daily basis or
195. 1976 Act § 213(c)(2), amending CODE § 704(a). Italicized portions indicate the
changes made by the 1976 Act.
196. 1976 Act § 213(c)(3)(A), amending CODE § 704:
(f) Cross Reference.-
For rules in the case of the sale, exchange, liquidation, or reduction of a partner's
interest, see section 706(c)(2).
197. 1976 Act § 210(c)(3)(B), amending CODE § 761:
(e) Cross Reference.-
For rules in the case of the sale, exchange, liquidation, or reduction of a partner's
interest, see sections 704(b) and 706(c)(2).
198. HousE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, SUMMARY OF THE CONFERENCE AGREEMENT
ON THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976 (H.R. 10612), 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as CONFERENCE COMMITTEE REPORTI.
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separate the partnership year into two (or more) segments and allo-
cate income, loss or special items in each segment among the persons
who were partners during that segment.199
Once again, the legislative history makes clear what the Act does not:
partners are to have the same flexibility to compute proration that they
presently have under existing Regulations concerning the sale by a
partner of his entire interest in the partnership. 20 0
The drafters understood that the computation alternatives in the
Regulations soften the impact of the proration requirement:
These rules will permit a partnership to choose the easier method of
prorating items according to the portion of the year for which a
partner was a partner or the more precise method of an interim clos-
ing of books (as if the year had closed) which, in some instances, will
be more advantageous where most of the deductible expenses were
paid or incurred upon or subsequent to the entry of the new partners
to the partnership.20'
Conversely, the percentage-of-the-year approach would be preferable to
the new member if most deductible expenses had been paid or accrued
prior to his admission.
The drafters probably did not understand that, within a few days
after the completion of their efforts, the Second Circuit would opine in
Rodman that the alternative computation methods in the Regulations
could result in an impermissible assignment of income:
Both Martin and the Commissioner contend that on remand the
share attributable to Martin should be computed simply by multiply-
ing the pro-rata portion of the year during which he owned his inter-
est (57/366) by his two-ninth's interest. See Treas. Reg. 1.706-1(C)(2).
We note, however, that such a simple pro-rata allocation could in
many instances result in a prohibited income assignment to Martin
if, for example, the substantial portion of the partnership's income
accrued prior to [his admission]. The record on appeal does not in-
dicate whether or not such is the case, and we leave to the tax court
to determine whether or not a simple pro rata allocation is appropri-
ate in this case.202
199. Id.
200. S. REP. No. 94-938 at 98:
[R]egulations are to apply the same alternative methods of computing allocations of
income and loss to situations falling under section 706(c)(2)(B) as those now applica-
ble to section 706(c)(2)(A) situations (sale or liquidation of an entire interest).
201. Id. (emphasis added).
202. 76-2 U.S.T.C. at 85,268 n.19.
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As the court stated earlier in its opinion,2 0 3 a violation of the principal
purpose limitation (now the substantial economic effect requirement)
follows from the assignment of income conclusion. Given that the
computation alternatives in the Regulations can be disregarded, it
seems clear that other strategies to soften the impact of the proration
requirement are also subject to challenge. Consider, for example,
whether the partners can simply refrain from paying for or accruing
expenses until new members are admitted. Such a strategy, although
suggested by the proration Regulations and the legislative history of
the 1976 Act, is an indirect allocation that presumably must pass muster
under 704(b). The essential question will be the extent to which the
timing of the expenditure represents business purpose or practice
rather than tax evasion. An attempt to trace the contribution of a year-
end admittee to a year-end expenditure to allocate him the resulting
deduction will be subject to the limitations on "soft money" allocations
discussed earlier.20 4
B. The Basic Allocation Rules
The 1976 Act completely rewrites the basic allocation provision, sub-
section 704(b):
(b) Determination of Distributive Share.-A partner's distributive
share of income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit (or item thereof) shall
be determined in accordance with the partner's interest in the part-
nership (determined by taking into account all facts and circum-
stances), if-
(1) the partnership agreement does not provide as to the part-
ner's distributive share of income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit
(or item thereof), or
(2) the allocation to a partner under the agreement of income,
gain, loss, deduction, or credit (or item thereof) does not have sub-
stantial economic effect. 205
203. 76-2 U.S.T.C. at 85,267.
204. See text accompanying notes 91-116 supra.
205. 1976 Act § 213(d), amending CODE § 704(b). The 1976 Act makes several other
changes in subchapter K that do not deal directly with partnership allocations but should
be mentioned because they are related restrictions on tax shelter partnerships. The most
significant is 1976 Act § 213(e), which provides that, except in the case of realty partner-
ships, a partner's basis in his partnership interest is not increased by nonrecourse
liabilities. The rule is incorporated by amending § 704(d) to provide as follows:
(d) Limitation on Allowance of Losses.-A partner's distributive share of partner-
ship loss (including capital loss) shall be allowed only to the extent of the adjusted
basis of such partner's interest in the partnership at the end of the partnership year
in which such loss occurred. . . . For purposes of this subsection, the adjusted basis
of any partner's interest in the partnership shall not include any portion of any
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The new 704(b) applies to partnership taxable years that begin after
December 31, 1975.206 However, to the extent it merely clarifies existing
law, it applies to all prior taxable years.
partnership liability with respect to which the partner has no personal liability. The
preceding sentence shall not apply with respect to any activity to the extent that
section 465 (relating to limiting deductions to amounts at risk in case of certain
activities) applies, nor shall it apply to any partnership the principal activity of
which is investing in real property (other than mineral property).
This new restriction applies to liabilities incurred after December 31, 1976. 1976 Act
§ 213(f)(2). The source of this was a floor amendment in the Senate, and the Conference
Committee Report explains its relationship to the new "at risk" provisions as follows:
The effect of this provision is to limit deductions which may be passed through to
a limited partner to the amount of investment which he actually has and will have
at risk in the partnership. It is intended that in determining whether a partner has
personal liability with respect to any partnership liability, the rules of section 465
(relating to the limitation on deductions to amounts at risk in case of certain activ-
ities) will apply. This provision will not apply to any activity to which section 465
(relating to the limitation on deductions to amounts at risk in case of certain activ-
ities) [sic] nor will it apply to any partnership the principal activity of which in-
volves real property (other than mineral property).
CONFERENCE COmMITTEE REPORT at 9.
1976 Act § 213(b)(3) amends CODE § 707(c) to emphasize the existing rule that guar-
anteed payments may not be used to transform capital expenditures into currently de-
ductible items. The new § 707(c) is as follows:
(c) Guaranteed Payments.-To the extent determined without regard to the in-
come of the partnership, payments to a partner for services or the use of capital
shall be considered as made to one who is not a member of the partnership, but
only for the purposes of section 61(a) (relating to gross income) and, subject to
section 263, for purposes of section 162(a) (relating to trade or business expenses).
[Emphasis added.]
A similar change, albeit one that does more than reiterate existing law, is effected by 1976
Act § 213(b)(1), which adds a new section to subchapter K, section 709:
SEC. 709. TREATMENT OF ORGANIZATION AND SYNDICATION FEES.
(a) General Rule.-Except as provided in subsection (b), no deduction shall be
allowed under this chapter to the partnership or to any partner for any amounts
paid or incurred to organize a partnership or to promote the sale of (or to sell) an
interest in such partnership.
(b) Amortization of Organization Fees.-
(1) Deduction.-Amounts paid or incurred to organize a partnership may, at
the election of the partnership, (made in accordance with regulations prescribed
by the Secretary), be treated as deferred expenses. Such deferred expenses shall be
allowed as a deduction ratably over such period of not less than 60 months as
may be selected by the partnership (beginning with the month in which the
partnership begins business), or if the partnership is liquidated before the end of
such 60-month period, such deferred expenses (to the extent not deducted under
this section) may be deducted to the extent provided in section 165.
(2) Organizational expenses defined.-The organizational expenses to which
paragraph (1) applies, are expenditures which-
(A) are incident to the creation of the partnership;
(B) are chargeable to capital account; and
(C) are of a character which, if expended incident to the creation of a
partnership having an ascertainable life, would be amortized over such life.
206. 1976 Act § 213(f)(1).
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One fundamental question about the new 704(b) is whether the
insertion of the "substantial economic effect" requirement to replace
the "principal purpose" limitation was intended to change existing law.
Surely no clarification results from replacing "principal purpose" with
"substantial economic effect." As explained earlier, 20 7 it has most com-
monly been assumed that the essential test for determining whether an
allocation satisfies the principal purpose limitation is whether it has
substantial economic effect. On the other hand, this assumed equiv-
alence also indicates that no change was intended. Indeed, the legislative
history contains numerous references to existing law for the determina-
tion of what constitutes substantial economic effect. 20 8
Can it be, then, that the addition of "substantial economic effect" to
replace "principal purpose" was intended neither to change nor clarify
existing law? Has the legislature committed a useless act? The "sub-
stantial economic effect" language was added by the Senate when it
scrapped the revision of 704(b) that was passed by the House. The
House Bill clearly reflected an intent to diminish the ability of partners
to allocate freely. It would have replaced the principal purpose limita-
tion with a two-pronged test. The House Bill would have disregarded
any allocation that is either without "a business purpose" or that re-
sults in a "significant avoidance or evasion of any tax."2 0 19 The Senate
Report states that the substantial economic effect requirement has "es-
sentially" the same intent as the two-pronged test in the House Bill:
While there is a difference in language, the intent of the committee
amendment and the House bill are essentially the same-both versions
seek to prevent the use of special allocations for tax avoidance pur-
poses, while allowing their use for bona fide business purposes.2 10
In a footnote, the Senate Committee Report explained the reason for
the change: 211
207. See text accompanying notes 72-79 supra.
208. Consider, for example, the following statement in the Senate Report:
Also, the committee believes that allocations of special items and overall alloca-
tions should be restricted to those situations where the allocations have substantial
economic effect, as presently interpreted by the regulations and case law.
S. REP. No. 94-938 at 99-100.
209. H.R. 10612 § 210(d) provided that the reallocation mechanism shall not be ap-
plied to allocations agreed upon by the partners if
the partner receiving the allocation can establish both that there is a business pur-
pose for this allocation and that no significant avoidance or evasion of any tax im-
posed by this subtitle results from such allocation.
210. S. REP. No. 94-938 at 100.
211. The Senate also scrapped the following two-step reallocation mechanism, which
was part of the House bill:
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Because of the use of the phrase "significant avoidance or evasion
of any tax ... results" (emphasis supplied) under the House bill, a
conceivable interpretation might cause the disallowance of a special
allocation to a high-bracket taxpayer, notwithstanding that the alloca-
tion had a business purpose and economic substance. 212
Thus, the Senate Report appears to adopt the House Report's emphasis
on the need for a business purpose to support a special allocation. This
will be viewed as a tightening of existing law by those who did not
interpret Orrisch to emphasize business purpose as the prime determi-
nant of the presence of substantial economic effect.
213
One additional point in the legislative history merits consideration
in connection with the issue of intent to change the basic rules of part-
nership allocations. Both the House and the Senate Reports contain the
following statement:
Under the partnership provisions, a limited (or a general) partner-
ship agreement may allocate income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit
(or items thereof) among the partners in a manner that is dispropor-
tionate to the capital contributions of such partners (sec. 704(a),
(b)(1)). These are sometimes referred to as "special allocations"....214
(b) Determination of Distributive Share.-
(1) Rule for allocations.-A partner's distributive share of income, gain, loss, de-
duction, or credit (or item thereof) shall be determined-
(A) in accordance with the partnership's permanent method of allocating the
taxable income referred to in section 702(a)(9), if there is such a method, or
(B) in accordance with the partner's interest in the partnership (determined
by taking into account all facts and circumstances) if the partnership has no
permanent method of allocating such taxable income.
H.R. 10612 § 210(d). The Senate retained the "interest in the partnership" feature of the
reallocation mechanism but deleted the "permanent method" test. It offered the following
explanation for the deletion:
The House bill provided a two-step method of reallocation which includes the pro-
vision described above in the [Senate] committee amendment but also provided for
the allocation to be determined in accordance with the partner's "permanent method
of allocating" the taxable income or loss (described under section 702(a)(9)), if there
is such a method. The committee amendment deletes this alternative because of the
difficulty in defining "permanent method of allocating" the items.
S. REP. No. 94-938 at 100. However, it would appear that the "permanent method" con-
cept was abandoned because the House had based it on its two-step amendment to the
principal purpose limitation, which the Senate also abandoned:
A partnership will ordinarily be considered to have a "permanent method" of
allocating taxable income or loss if (1) it has consistently applied such method over
a number of years, and (2) it meets both the business purpose and significant tax
avoidance tests provided under the amended section 704(b).
H.R. REP. No. 94-658 at 127.
212. S. REP. No. 94-938 at 100 n.ll.
213. See text accompanying notes 72-90 supra.
214. H.R. REP. No. 94-658 at 125; S. RF'. No. 94-938 at 98.
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This statement is striking because the term "special allocation" is the
shorthand term that has been used to refer to allocations that are sub-
ject to the principal purpose limitation. Presumably, the term will be
used in the future to refer to allocations that will be subject to the sub-
stantial economic effect requirement. The question can be put simply:
does the statement just quoted imply that allocations based on capital
contribution are not special allocations subject to the substantial eco-
nomic effect requirement? Stated differently, does the quoted language
indicate that any allocation based on capital contribution will, by virtue
of the correlation, be deemed to have substantial economic effect?
It is submitted that the answer to this question is no: allocations
based on capital contributions should continue to be subject to the
substantial economic effect requirement. To hold otherwise would con-
vert an artless sentence in the legislative history into a major liberaliza-
tion of the law of partnership allocations, particularly as it applies to
tax shelters, without any other indication that a liberalization was in-
tended. It is clear that it would constitute a liberalization to insulate
allocations correlated with capital contributions from challenge. We
have seen that Orrisch strongly suggests that depreciation deductions
cannot be allocated on the basis of initial capital contribution unless
initial contribution also controls some economic component of what
the partners pull out of the partnership. We have also considered a
Revenue Ruling that refers, to an allocation based on initial capital
contribution as a "special allocation" and subjects it to the principal
purpose limitation. 215 Finally, initial capital contributions can be very
easily manipulated. We have seen, for example, that to allocate sub-
stantial amounts of losses to high-bracket investors, promoters of tax
shelters frequently credit themselves with little or no initial capital con-
tribution.2 16 To forego the credit costs nothing whenever allocations of
cash benefits are made independently of initial contribution. In short,
any interpretation of the statute or legislative history that would place
allocations based on capital contributions beyond the substantial eco-
nomic effect requirement would constitute a retreat in the law because
it Would provide a safe harbor into which the most extreme allocation
arrangements could easily be drafted. Indeed, it would insure pro-
moters of tax shelter partnerships that they will be free from challenge
if they structure their allocation arrangements in precisely the way they
would prefer to structure them. Not only would such an interpretation
grant promoters a safe harbor they have not had under prior authority,
it also would clash directly with the inescapable purpose of the 1976
215. Rev. Rul. 66-187, supra note 98.
216. See text accompanying notes 146-58 supra.
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Act to subject bottom-line allocations to the substantial economic effect
requirement.
The primary purpose of the new section 704(b) is to make clear that
bottom-line allocations are subject to the same limitations as allocations
of individual items. The new provision changes two features of 704(b)
that have supported arguments that bottom-line allocations are not
subject to limitation. First, recall that the principal purpose limitation,
by its terms, applies to allocations of any "item." It has been argued that
the partnership's bottom line is not subject to the principal purpose
limitation because it is a "composite" rather than an "item." 217 The
new 704(b) makes it inescapable that the new substantial economic
effect requirement applies to allocations of composites because it in-
cludes in every subsection the disjunctive parenthetical "(or item
thereof)." Second, recall that it has been argued that it is pointless to
disregard an allocation of taxable income or loss only to subject it to
the reallocation mechanism of "taxable income or loss of the partner-
ship, as described in section 702(a)(9). ' l18 The new reallocation mecha-
nism of "the partner's interest in the partnership '(determined by tak-
ing into account all facts and circumstances)" applies as easily to
bottom-line allocations as it does to allocations of individual items.
Both these changes, it is submitted, do nothing more than clarify exist-
ing law.219
Nevertheless, the clarifications may be the beginning of a new stage
in the development of the law of partnership taxation. Many funda-
mental concepts in the area of partnership tax are extremely undevel-
oped. A major reason for the lack of development is that the provisions
of subchapter K are both complex and obtuse. The Tax Court itself
has strongly protested their obscurity:
The distressingly complex and confusing nature of the provisions
of subchapter K present a formidable obstacle to the comprehension
of these provisions without the expenditure of a disproportionate
amount of time and effort even by one who is sophisticated in tax
matters with many years of experience in the tax field .... Surely, a
statute has not achieved "simplicity" when its complex provisions may
confidently be dealt with by at most only a comparatively small num-
ber of specialists who have been initiated into its mysteries.220
217.. See text accompanying notes 159-63 supra.
218. See text accompanying notes 163-68 supra.
219. See text accompanying notes 156-68 supra, and Weidner, Passing Depreciation to
Investor-Partners, 25 S.C. L. REv. 215 (1973).
220. David A. Foxman, 41 T.C. 535, 551 n.9 (1964) (citations omitted).
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On too many important issues, the cases, Regulations, and rulings fail
to give guidance as to the meaning of the statute. The controversy con-
cerning bottom-line allocations is illustrative. Perhaps it is neither
surprising nor indicative of professional incompetence that many ac-
countants and attorneys have assumed that whatever constitutes "tax-
able income or loss" in a partnership agreement also constitutes "tax-
able income or loss of the partnership, as described in section 702(a)(9)"
within the meaning of the statute. True, counsel in other substantive
areas are often quickly and properly denounced for espousing the "plain
meaning" of a statute without first divining its purpose.2 21 True, also,
there is no legislative history that even suggests an intent to give carte
blanche approval to pure bottom-line allocations that separate tax losses
from cash benefits and deliver them to high-bracket limited partners.
The prevalence of the assumption that bottom-line allocations have
been free from limitation is based in part on the fact that the assump-
tion is made in an area of the law in which it is often considered quite
an achievement for the nonspecialist to divine any meaning, "plain" or
otherwise, from a subchapter calculated more to frustrate than inform.
Its prevalence is also based in part on the fact that neither legislative
history, judicial decisions, regulations, nor rulings have offered any
clear refutation of the assumption. The absence of clear authority af-
fects the staff of the Service in much the same way as it affects private
practitioners, and may therefore also explain why the assumption has
been a safe one on which to rely.
The new 704(b) precludes continued reliance on the "plain mean-
ing" of the allocation rules by stripping them of plain meaning. The
legislative history makes clear that the new reallocation mechanism is a
flexible standard that will apply differently depending upon the part-
nership under consideration:
In determining a "partner's interest in the partnership", all the
221. See, e.g., Heydon's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 637 (Exch. 1584):
And it was resolved by them [the judges] that for the sure and true interpretation
of all statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the
common law), four things are to be discerned and considered:-
1st. What was the common law before the making of the Act.
2nd. What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not pro-
vide.
3rd. What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the dis-
ease of the commonwealth.
And 4th. The true reason of the remedy; and then the office of all the Judges is
always to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the
remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mis-
chief, and pro privato commodo, and to add force and life to the cure and remedy,
according to the true intent of the makers of the Act, pro bono publico.
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facts and circumstances are to be taken into account. Among the
relevant factors to be taken into account are the interests of respective
partners in profits and losses (if different from that of taxable income
or loss), cash flow; and their rights to distributions of capital upon
liquidation.222
With this particular clarification comes uncertainty. There is a change
from a rule that had been viewed by many as a fixed standard with a
plain meaning to a rule that appears almost perfectly elastic.
Regulations are needed to clarify the application of the flexible re-
allocation mechanism and its impact on related concepts. Consider
limited partnership GAB that owns an highly-leveraged apartment
building; its members are general partner G and limited partners A and
B. Assume that the partnership agreement initially provides four dif-
ferent ratios-one contribution ratio and three allocation ratios:
Initial Proceeds of
Capital Net Refinancing Taxable Income
Contribution Cash Flow or Sale or Loss
G 0% 50% 60% 10%
A 50 25 20 45
B 50 25 20 45
Assume that the partners adhere to this allocation arrangement during
years one through four and then deviate from it in year five as follows:
(1) the entire partnership depreciation deduction for year five is allo-
cated to B and taxable income or loss, computed without regard to
depreciation, is allocated according to the original taxable income or
loss ratio; (2) in year five, B was in need of deductions whereas G and
A were not because they experienced surplus losses from other sources;
and (3) the allocation had no substantial economic effect because it,
like the special allocation of depreciation in Orrisch, had no effect on
any of the non-tax arrangements of the partners. How does the new
reallocation mechanism apply to reallocate the depreciation deduction
in year five?
Each of the partnership's four ratios could be considered to reflect
some dimension of a "partner's interest in the partnership." Consider
first the factors the Senate Report states should be taken into account:
(1) the interests of respective partners in profits and losses (if different
from that of taxable income or loss); (2) cash flow; and (3) their rights
to distributions of capital upon liquidation. Does the fact that capital
contribution is not one of the factors listed suggest that the partners'
222. S. REP. No. 94-938 at 100.
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contribution ratio is not to be considered in the determination of a
"partner's interest in the partnership"? The Senate Report is subject
to interpretation on this point, because its language is illustrative rather
than exclusive. However, it is noteworthy that it does define the
"partner's interest in the partnership" solely in terms of measures of
what the partners pull out of the partnership and not in terms of what
they put in. As suggested above, this seems to be the appropriate ap-
proach, particularly when dealing with the deduction for deprecia-
tion.223
Consider, then, which of the other ratios should control, whether
some sort of weighted average of the ratios should control, or whether
additional factors should also be considered. Note first that there is
nothing to suggest that the depreciation should be returned to the
partnership's bottom line only to be reallocated according to the part-
ners' ratio for sharing taxable income or loss. Indeed, if the 1976 Act
does anything, it makes clear that the allocation of taxable income or
loss used in the hypothetical in years one through four may also be
disregarded because it is as subject to the substantial economic effect
requirement as is the naked allocation of depreciation in year five. If
the thesis of this article is correct, the disregarded allocation of de-
preciation will be reallocated in accordance with one or more of the
meaningful measures of anticipated cash benefits, which will vary from
partnership to partnership. For example, if net cash flow is the only
meaningful measure of anticipated cash benefits, other allocation ratios
need not be considered in making the reallocation. To the extent the
Service identifies the application of the reallocation mechanism, it will
be establishing norms against which proposed allocations can be evalu-
ated.
The regulations that clarify how the substantial economic effect
requirement and new reallocation mechanism apply to various alloca-
tion arrangements should be coordinated with the regulations under
the. new rule that prohibits partners from increasing their bases by
nonrecourse liabilities. Real estate partnerships are excepted from this
rule, and an important unanswered question is whether limited part-
ners in real estate partnerships will continue to share in nonrecourse
liabilities in the same proportion they share in "profits." If the answer is
yes, regulations should clarify what constitutes a profits interest in dif-
ferent situations. The legislative history of the reallocation mechanism
makes clear that a partner's profits interest is a flexible concept that, for
example, may be different from his interest in taxable income and dif-
ferent from his interest in net cash flow.
223. See text accompanying notes 71-90 and 146-68 supra.
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IV. CONCLUSION
There is an urgent need for regulations that clarify the meaning
and importance of several concepts central to the law of partnership
taxation. The need is caused by the interrelationships of two basic
realities of current use of the partnership form. First, it is extremely
common for partnerships to have several ratios for sharing the different
dimensions of partnership assets and activities. This is true of partner-
ships in numerous industries and activities, and of partnerships of all
sizes. Second, it is extremely common for partners to attempt to allocate
tax benefits and burdens differently than they allocate cash benefits and
burdens. This tends to be and will continue to be particularly true of
real estate partnerships, which survive relatively unscathed as a viable
tax shelter. Depreciation deductions and the tax losses they produce are
viewed as commodities to be bartered among partners, as are the de-
ductions stemming from particular cash expenditures, whether the
partnership be a nationwide public syndication or a handful of local
businessmen. However large or small the cast of characters, it almost
invariably consists of investors in need of tax losses who combine with
promoters or investors who have little or no need for tax losses or who,
indeed, because of surplus losses from other sources, are in a position to
"eat" the taxable income of high-bracket investors willing to affiliate
themselves as general or limited partners.
Most basically, regulations should explain when tax benefits can be
allocated in accordance with what partners contribute to a partnership
and when tax benefits must be allocated in accordance with the part-
ners' meaningful measure for sharing the anticipated cash benefits of
partnership assets and activities. The new regulations should inform
attorneys and accountants, who have scant authority to guide them,
when, if ever, it is appropriate to allocate depreciation deductions, or
the bottom-line losses that result, on the basis of capital contribution
or liability exposure rather than in accordance with one or all of the
ratios for sharing anticipated cash benefits. Similarly, the new "at risk"
rules, together with the new rule that prohibits partners in other than
real estate partnerships from increasing their bases by nonrecourse
liabilities, will require new regulations concerning the manner in
which partners share in liabilities for basis purposes. If limited partners
in real estate partnerships will continue to share in nonrecourse liabil-
ities in the same proportion as they share in "profits," the identity of
the profits interest in various situations must be clarified. Finally,
guidance should be given about the extent to which partners may trace
their capital contributions to soft money expenditures and claim the
corresponding deductions.
1977] PARTNERSHIP ALLOCATIONS 65
The fundamental thesis of this article is that the basic content of
the new reallocation mechanism, which should be viewed as the gen-
eral norm for allocations, and the basic content of the profits concept
are the same: the meaningful measure of anticipated cash benefits of
the partnership in question. This approach is particularly appropriate
when the issue is the allocation of depreciation deductions or the
bottom-line losses they create. A different approach is appropriate,
however, when certain partners are allocated the deductions for actual
cash expenditures they alone shoulder. In general, soft money alloca-
tions are appropriate when the burden is traced to particular partners
because of normal business considerations but inappropriate when
traced because of an attempt by partners to allocate among themselves
the deductions, credits, or increases in bases that most comport with
their individual tax pictures.
